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INTRODUCTION
Vice presidential selection is one of the most covered stories of any presidential
cycle. It sends the clearest message of the campaign about the presidential candidate as a
decision maker. But the framework in which we discuss it is increasingly obsolete and
approaching mere superstition. This thesis tracks the evolution of the selection process
and criteria, particularly through its most significant changes in the twentieth century. It
develops new norms for selection procedures and universal criteria.
Conventional wisdom holds that running mates do not matter in presidential
voting decisions because voters do not go to the polls to vote for – or against – vice
presidents. Journalists repeat this truism every four years. In 2000, The New York Times
wrote that although vice presidential candidates become the subject of intense attention
for brief periods of the summer, “That’s as long as they matter because people vote for
presidents, not vice presidents.”1 In 1988, commentator William Schneider said, “People
don’t vote for vice president. It’s important to the convention, and it’s important [when]
there’s nothing else to talk about, but in the end […] it’s not important.”2 In 2008,
longtime Republican strategist Ed Rollins claimed on CNN, “At the end of the day,
nobody votes for vice president. All a vice president does is sort of bring your party
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Adam Clymer, “The Nation; Choosing a Running Mate Matters. Or, Mattered.,” New York Times, August
20, 2000.
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together and make people feel good coming out of a convention.”3 But vice presidents do
not need to win votes for the ticket directly to matter in elections. Voters, aided by the
media, now assess running mates as reflections of the presidential candidates who choose
them. Although voters appear unlikely to determine their presidential votes on whom
they would rather see as vice president, vice presidential selection may play a meaningful
role in shaping how voters think about the presidential nominees.
Vice presidents matter on their own as well. Nine vice presidents have succeeded
to the presidency, and 14 of 44 presidents have been vice presidents, including seven of
the last nineteen.4 Today, even vice presidents who do not become president matter
because they can wield policy and political influence in the White House and on Capitol
Hill. Understanding how and why they get there can illuminate their behavior in office
and explain the presidents they serve.5
For much of American history, the vice presidency has been held in low esteem.
Vice presidential scholarship matched the conventional regard for the office. Political
scientist and future president Woodrow Wilson reflected the collective scholarly wisdom
on the vice presidency when he wrote in 1900, “The chief embarrassment in discussing
his office is, that in explaining how little there is to be said about it one has evidently said
all there is to say.”6 But in the second half of the twentieth century, political scientists and
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4
Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 3rd ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 211.
5
Some background research draws on my first work on the vice presidency for a paper in 2010. Here and a
few other places in this thesis use language based on that paper; where this occurs, it will be noted. That
paper is included at the end of the thesis. Jake Petzold, “The Modern American Vice Presidency: A BFD”
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authors began to pursue serious studies of the office. Yet the scholarship remains limited
and intermittent.
Political scientist Joel Goldstein’s 1982 book The Modern American Vice
Presidency: The Transformation of a Political Institution, offered the first extensive
update to vice presidential scholarship in several decades. It was the first comprehensive
analysis of vice presidential selection and operation within a broader political context.
The book considered the selection and performance of vice presidents between January
1953 and January 1981, and observed a growth in the office’s stature that corresponded
to general political trends: “the nationalization of politics, the increased expectations of
government, the rise of the presidency, the decline of parties, and the acceptance of an
international role.” Goldstein also raised the previous decade’s common criticisms of the
vice presidency and dissected proposals for reform. Goldstein chose his timeframe to fill
the gap since the previous major study, and covers a great deal of broad technological and
political change that prompted extensive changes in the vice presidency. But those
changes accelerated and expanded in the decades since, and Goldstein’s work serves as a
solid basis for contemporary studies.7
In 1984 political scientist Paul Light published Vice-Presidential Power: Advice
and Influence in the White House. Light examined the vice presidencies of Nelson
Rockefeller and Walter Mondale, investigating their policy influence in the White House.
Light found that increased resources – including staff and access to the president, senior
staff, and important information – enlarged the scope of vice presidential influence
substantially for Rockefeller and to a greater degree for Mondale. His brief consideration
7

Joel K. Goldstein, The Modern American Vice Presidency: the Transformation of a Political Institution
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
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of George H.W. Bush suggested that the office’s influence held in the Reagan
administration.8
Lee Sigelman and Paul Wahlbeck’s 1997 article “The ‘Veepstakes’: Strategic
Choice in Presidential Running Mate Selection,” undertook an empirical analysis of vice
presidential selection. They found that coming from a big state, having participated in the
presidential primaries, and differing in age from presidential nominees by more than ten
years make vice presidential finalists more likely to be nominated. But they do not
address the merit of using these factors in the decision process – or how candidates
selected with these criteria have impacted elections.9
Political scientist Jody Baumgartner’s 2006 book The American Vice Presidency
Reconsidered collects extensive information on vice presidents and vice presidential
candidates – particularly those since 1960. He identifies important criteria and conditions
affecting the vice presidency and vice presidential selection. But the book’s analysis is
cursory.10
In 2008, Presidential Studies Quarterly and the University of Minnesota staged a
“Symposium on the New Vice Presidency.” The symposium collected the contemporary
scholarship on the vice presidency in an effort to encourage more attention to the subject.
One product of the project, Mark Hiller and Douglas Kriner’s article “Institutional
Change and the Dynamics of Vice Presidential Selection,” advanced important new
thinking. They identify the McGovern-Fraser reforms to the Democratic Party’s
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presidential nomination process and the Eagleton affair of 1972 as the catalysts for a
reshuffling of vice presidential selection criteria. Their empirical analysis demonstrates
that since the 1976 election, extensive public affairs experience became the primary
determining factor in vice presidential selection. But their work on why the selection
criteria changed leaves out how.11
No recent scholarship has brought together the emerging criteria in their historical
context, evaluated the merits of such criteria, examined the political discussion around
them, and explored how changes in the selection process both contributed and responded
to the shifting criteria. This thesis aims to fill these gaps. In short, it seeks to explain how
modern presidential nominees have chosen their running mates and how future
candidates should do so.
The thesis finds that successful vice presidential selections share a process based
on nine consistent elements: time, dedicated vetters, a small circle of confidants,
extensive personal and political vetting, polling, interviews, secrecy, disclosure of the
short list, and an announcement event. The process is meant to find a candidate who
meets both the specific criteria of the presidential nominee and two universal and crucial
criteria. A running mate should bolster the ticket – not balance it – by extending the
presidential nominee’s narrative into uncovered territory. And he or she must
demonstrate competence – the ability to serve as president should the need arise, and to
be a valuable White House partner to the president in the meantime.
The first chapter of this thesis addresses the selection process and the following
two chapters address the two universal selection criteria. Chapter I analyzes the history of
11

Mark Hiller and Douglas Kriner, “Institutional Change and the Dynamics of Vice Presidential Selection,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 2008): 401-21.
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the selection process and its modern implications. Vice presidents today are chosen quite
differently from their eighteenth century forebears. The Constitution made the
presidential runner up the vice president. The Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804, led
to the practice of electing unified president-vice president tickets on separate ballots. In
the mid-twentieth century, presidential nominating power came to rest more among
primary voters than among convention delegates and party bosses, and the vice
presidential nominating power came to rest in the democratically chosen nominees. And
due to reforms in the presidential nomination process, presidential nominees had
increasing amounts of time to conduct their running mate searches. The nominees’ new
authority in the process reshuffled the dominant criteria. The following two chapters
address those criteria.
Chapter II explores the idea of ticket “balance.” Balance between the presidential
and vice presidential candidates along regional, factional, ideological, experiential, and
religious lines once represented the primary goal of vice presidential selection, often to
point of dismissing other considerations. But as conventions lost their prominence in both
presidential and vice presidential nomination, candidates assumed the central role in
campaigns, and mobilizing the party base became less important than persuading
unaligned voters. So satisfying strategically important or disaffected wings of the party
lost its utility. When pundits now discuss balancing the ticket, they should be talking
about bolstering it. Instead of offsetting the characteristics of a presidential nominee, the
campaign should use the running mate to carry the nominee’s narrative into new territory.
Chapter III describes the emergence of competence as a factor in vice presidential
selection. Because vice presidents did nearly nothing for most of the office’s history, the

7

quality of their performance in office did not matter. And because no individual held
singular authority in the selection decision, no one could be held accountable for poor
choices. But with Harry Truman’s sudden, unprepared ascendance to the Oval Office, the
risks of presidential succession in the nuclear age became apparent. And the continued
growth of federal programs following the New Deal created more government to be
managed. A competent second officer became valuable to the presidency for governance
considerations. But only after the process changes of the second half of the twentieth
century did electoral politics encourage governance criteria in the vice presidential
selection. Running mate selection came to be viewed as a nominee’s “first presidential
decision,” and a major heuristic in evaluating his judgment. Presidential nominees who
choose running mates of questionable competence suffer for their lapse in judgment.

CHAPTER I
Jimmy Carter and a New Selection Process
The “Veepstakes” has become one of the most-covered stories of modern
presidential elections. In 2012, speculation about Mitt Romney’s running mate pick
exploded in the days immediately following rival Rick Santorum’s exit from the
Republican primary race – and will increase until the decision is announced.1 When
announced, the ticket will be the result of a prolonged and methodical evaluation by the
Romney campaign.
Only four decades earlier, the selection process took a few hours and was the
subject of little speculation. In the office’s early days, the vice president was merely a
byproduct of the presidential election. But as the presidential election process changed,
the vice presidential selection process changed along with it. In 1976, Jimmy Carter
responded to his political environment with a series of steps that became today’s
“Veepstakes.”

Traditional Selection
Under the Constitution’s original design, the second-place finisher in the Electoral
College vote for president became the vice president. This system put the second-best
candidate for president, in the judgment of the electors, into in the vice presidency.
Should the presidency become vacant, it would be filled by someone who had been
1

CNN Saturday Morning, “Secret Service Embarrassment; Plains States Brace for Storms; Battle to Win
Women Voters,” CNN, April 14, 2012, transcript, LexisNexis Academic, (accessed April 17, 2012).
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selected for the office by a meaningful portion of the electorate.2 The 1800 presidential
election demonstrated the challenge of this scheme following the introduction of party
nominations. The Democratic-Republican Party nominated Vice President Thomas
Jefferson for president and former New York Senator Aaron Burr for vice president.
Intending to elect this ticket, electors inadvertently cast the same number of votes for
both Jefferson and Burr, leading to a dramatic standstill before former Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton pushed the voting in Jefferson’s direction.3
The country ratified the Twelfth Amendment in 1804 to remove this
constitutional confusion. The amendment required electors to “name in their ballots the
person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as VicePresident.”4 In light of political parties’ growing power, some politicians expressed
worries about changing the mode of vice presidential selection. Delaware Senator Samuel
White predicted:
Character, talents, virtue, and merit will not be sought after, in the
candidate. The question will not be asked, is he capable? Is he honest? But
can he by his name, by his connexions, by his wealth, by his local
situation, by his influence, or his intrigues, best promote the election of a
President?5
The selection system that emerged did not allay these fears. Electors – many at the
direction of state statute – cast ballots for presidents and vice presidents of the same
party.6 Party caucuses and then conventions became the dominant actors in presidential

2

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “On the Presidential Succession,” Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 3
(Autumn, 1974): 490-491.
3
Peter Onuf ed., “Thomas Jefferson: Campaigns and Elections,” American President: A Reference
Resource, http://millercenter.org/president/jefferson/essays/biography/3 (accessed April 8, 2012).
4
Jody C. Baumgartner, The American Vice Presidency Reconsidered (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 10.
5
Schlesinger, “On the Presidential Succession,” 491.
6
Akhil Reed Amar and Vik Amar, “President Quayle,” Virginia Law Review, 78, no. 4 (May, 1992): 92227.
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and vice presidential nominations.7 Parties approached running mate selection by doing
what parties are supposed to do: try to win elections.
The fourth and final day of conventions were typically spent on the vice
presidential nomination. Following the presidential nomination on the third night,
potential vice presidential candidates maneuvered for the slot and party leaders
deliberated about the most electorally advantageous candidate. Names were placed in
nomination and the delegates chose a nominee. The new presidential and vice
presidential candidates delivered their acceptance speeches to close the convention that
night.8
In 1920, Democratic presidential nominee Ohio Governor James Cox had
unprecedented but still limited involvement with the selection of Woodrow Wilson’s
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt as his running mate.9 As the
party’s presidential nominee twenty years later, Roosevelt realized the strategic value of
selecting his own running mate. Concerned that no other potential candidate would
support the New Deal, Roosevelt instructed the convention to nominate Secretary of
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. Meeting with significant resistance, Roosevelt dispatched
his wife Eleanor to the convention and made it known that he would refuse to run without
Wallace.10 Wallace became the vice presidential nominee on July 19, 1940, and

7

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Presidential Elections in the United States: A
Primer by Kevin J. Coleman, Joseph E. Cantor, and Thomas H. Neale, CRS Report RL30527 (Washington,
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, April 17, 2000), 17-19.
8
Congressional Research Service. Presidential Elections, 29-30.
9
Baumgartner, American Vice Presidency Reconsidered, 26.
10
Diane M. Blair, “No Ordinary Time: Eleanor Roosevelt’s Address to the 1940 Democratic National
Convention,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 4, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 203-22.
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Roosevelt became the first presidential nominee to dictate his choice of running mate to
the convention.11
By 1960, presidential nominees’ prerogative to select their own running mates
became the standard.12 But how presidential nominees chose their running mates
remained in flux for the next decades. Individual nominees and their political
circumstances shaped the procedures candidates use to find a vice presidential nominee.

Jimmy Carter
In 1976, former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter conducted his vice presidential
selection in a different fashion from any previous nominees. Most nominees since Carter
have used a similar selection process.13 His major innovations include time, public
disclosure of the finalists, interviews, and the “vetting” of personal information.* The
“Carter Model” now constitutes the elements of the “Veepstakes.” Although Carter’s
process became the effective standard, it resulted from a particular political and personal
context. The dominant factors in this context were a new public focus on the vice
presidency, the timing of the primaries and convention, and Carter’s political style.
The 1976 presidential election marked the end of a period of upheaval that
generated unprecedented attention to the vice presidency. In 1963, President John F.
Kennedy’s assassination elevated Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Oval Office.

11

Baumgartner, American Vice Presidency Reconsidered, 26.
Baumgartner, American Vice Presidency Reconsidered, 3.
13
Baumgartner, American Vice Presidency Reconsidered, 62-63.
*
In 1964, Lyndon Johnson held interviews before naming Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as his running
mate. But he did so under circumstances unique in the twentieth century: as a popular incumbent president
guaranteed his party’s nomination, but with a vacant vice presidency. So Carter was the first nonincumbent presidential candidate to conduct interviews for the ticket, and most candidates after him have
done so.
12
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The Twenty-fifth Amendment, which clarified the processes for presidential and vice
presidential succession, became part of the U.S. Constitution in 1967.14
The 1968 Democratic National Convention hurt the Democratic Party. Johnson
decided not to seek reelection as Senators Robert F. Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy ran
against his policies in a divisive primary contest. On June 4, Kennedy was assassinated
following his victory in the California primary. The convention nominated Vice President
Hubert Humphrey, who had not entered a single primary, as violence erupted outside of
the convention hall and chaos within. The fiasco prompted the Democratic Party to
appoint a Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, known as the
McGovern-Fraser Commission for its chairs South Dakota Senator George McGovern
and Minnesota Representative Donald Fraser. The McGovern-Fraser reforms
concentrated the presidential nominating power in binding state primaries, limiting the
role of party leaders and favorite son candidates. Empowered by the new rules,
McGovern won the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination.15
McGovern began the Convention in Miami with a large pledged delegate lead, but
the nomination still in doubt, pending a credentials challenge by the persevering antiMcGovern camp. Missouri Senator Thomas Eagleton joined the ticket after several
Democratic politicians declined the offer.16 But a few days later, the media began
reporting Eagleton’s history of mental health struggles, including a hospitalization for

14

Andrew Glass, “The 25th Amendment Was Ratified, Feb. 10, 1967,” Politico, February 10,
2012.http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72700.html (accessed April 17, 2012).
15
Penn Kemble, “The New Politics,” Commentary, December 1972,
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-new-politics-the-democrats/ (accessed April 17, 2012).
16
Robert Shrum, No Excuses: Concessions of a Serial Campaigner (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster,
2007), 41-45.
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nervous exhaustion, for which he received electric shock therapy.17 Amid a media
firestorm, McGovern voiced “1,000 percent” support for his running mate in a press
conference that one aide called “catastrophic.” Eagleton failed to recall the name of the
medication he was taking, managing only that it was “a little blue pill.” He offered to
withdraw, but McGovern allowed him to stay on the ticket and see what happened. But,
as McGovern speechwriter Robert Shrum described, “The dialogue was so consumed by
the Eagleton issue that nothing else the presidential candidate said would be heard.”18
Within two weeks, McGovern asked Eagleton to withdraw, citing the controversy as a
distraction. An ad hoc Democratic National Committee meeting approved Kennedy
brother-in-law and former Camelot figure Sargent Shriver as the new nominee. 19
McGovern identified the “Eagleton affair,” as it came to be known, as the main reason
for his decisive defeat. He called it “the number one news and editorial development of
that campaign. It overshadowed the Watergate scandal as a subject of journalistic
concern. It—not Watergate, not Vietnam, not the American economy—was the political
story of 1972.”20
In 1973, recently reelected Vice President Spiro Agnew faced imminent
indictment on charges relating to political corruption. Although President Richard Nixon
had joked about Agnew being his insurance against impeachment, the White House
began to fear the prospect of a double impeachment. Over several months rumors swirled
and information dripped out. By September, Nixon’s team persuaded Agnew to resign.

17

Baumgartner, American Vice Presidency Reconsidered, 61.
Shrum, No Excuses, 47.
19
Shrum, No Excuses, 48-49.
20
Mark Hiller and Douglas Kriner, “Institutional Change and the Dynamics of Vice Presidential Selection,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 2008): 406-407.
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He pleaded nolo contendere, paid $160,000 in back taxes, and received a suspended
sentence and a $10,000 fine. Nixon appointed House Majority Leader Gerald Ford to the
vice presidency under the new rules of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.21 Before he was
able to move into the vice president’s official residence, he succeeded to the presidency
following Nixon’s resignation.22 The first (and thus far only) unelected president, Ford
appointed New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller to the vice presidency under the
procedures of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.23 In 1976, Ford ran for election in his own
right, but as an incumbent president running without an incumbent vice president.24
The selection process came into attention for the scandals of both 1972 vice
presidential nominees. Most observers believed a more thorough selection process would
have unearthed Agnew’s and Eagleton’s problems before their nominations.25 In 1976,
The New York Times described the situation thus: “In a way that is unprecedented in
recent years, the eyes of the nation are focused on the Democratic selection for the Vice
Presidency; rarely if ever in this century has the country been so conscious of the
importance of the choice.”26 Concerns about the vice presidency’s recent turmoil
prompted scholarly, legislative, and popular proposals for reform.

21

Mark O. Hatfield, with the Senate Historical Office, “Spiro Theodore Agnew (1969-1973),” Vice
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1983): 201.
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24
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25
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FDR aide Benjamin V. Cohen proposed separate, simultaneous elections for
president and vice president, chosen from the parties’ nominees for the offices.27 Former
Massachusetts Governor Endicott Peabody suggested that vice presidential candidates be
drawn only from those who participated in presidential primaries.28 He offered that
primary voters could be allowed two votes to ensure the nomination of a like-minded
ticket.29 Rosemary Ginn, chair of the GOP Delegates and Organization Committee
pushed to have the vice presidential nomination precede the presidential nomination at
Republican National Conventions. Under this system, candidates would run for the office
in the same public fashion as presidential candidates and be chosen independently. Thus,
candidates would undergo the public scrutiny that comes with a campaign and avoid a
selection based on the narrow political calculations of the presidential candidate.30
Former vice presidential nominees Representative William Miller and Sargent Shriver
both supported what Newsweek described as “a separate-but-nearly-equal convention to
nominate the Veep.”31 Senator Robert Griffin introduced a constitutional amendment that
would adapt the procedures of the Twenty-fifth Amendment: presidential candidates
would run solo, then, upon victory, submit their vice presidential choice to both houses of
Congress for advice and consent. Representative James O’Hara and historian and
Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger Jr. both proposed abolishing the vice presidency
altogether.32

27

Schlesinger, “On the Presidential Succession,” 482.
Endicott Peabody, “For a Grassroots Vice-Presidency,” New York Times, January 25, 1974.
29
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30
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In response to the Eagleton fiasco, the Democratic National Committee appointed
a commission headed by former Vice President Humphrey to propose changes to the
process. In December 1973, the Humphrey Commission delivered its proposal to the full
Democratic National Committee. According to The New York Times, its
recommendations included a period of “at least 48 hours between selection of the party’s
Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees, accommodated by adding a fifth day to
future conventions,” and the option to “defer the choice of a running mate for up to three
weeks, [and have the DNC] act as a Vice-Presidential Convocation to consider the
choice.”33
The Institute of Politics at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government also
convened a Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection. In its June 1976 report, the
Study Group’s recommendations included:
•

Moving the presidential nomination earlier and the vice presidential nomination
later within party conventions;

•

Establishing formal advisory committees within the parties, and requiring
presidential contenders to submit their preferred running mates to the committees;

•

Conducting FBI background checks on prospective candidates; and

•

Increasing media coverage of vice presidential nominees.34
By 1976, none of these proposals had advanced. But under the Democrats’ new

nominating rules, now better established and understood, Carter secured the nomination

33

Associated Press, “Democrats Assay Vice-Presidency,” New York Times, December 15, 1973.
Institute of Politics, Report of the Study Group On Vice-Presidential Selection (Cambridge: John
Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1976), 10-22.
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through binding primaries five weeks ahead of the Democratic National Convention.
Carter thus had the one element all the reform proposals shared: more time to deliberate.
Carter’s process reflected his political style. He had a reputation as methodical,
analytical, deliberative – and he lived up to it.35 This sort of decision-making reinforced
Carter’s campaign themes of transparency, honesty, and competence.36 By conducting a
thorough, open process, Carter demonstrated his commitment to good government.
Finally, as an unconventional candidate, Carter sought any advantage he could attain.
Freed from the traditions surrounding the process, he expressed eagerness to do things
differently. The politics encouraged Carter to choose his running mate through a new
procedure.
Although nothing precluded Carter from deciding and announcing his running
mate in the traditional 24-hour period, Carter started considering the vice presidency
early. The preliminary running mate search started on April 17, when Carter received a
memo from his staff regarding possible procedures.37 On June 2, Carter began sorting
through a staff-prepared list of 300-400 Democratic figures.38 This list included senators,
representatives, governors, mayors, and university presidents, among others.39
From the early stages of the selection process, Carter relied on his close friend
and attorney Charles Kirbo, in addition to campaign manager Hamilton Jordan and press

35
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39
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secretary Jody Powell.40 According to Newsweek, “Kirbo is Carter’s senior and most
trusted adviser, a man whose values and life-style closely reflect Carter’s own.”41
(Kirbo’s age – 59 – also provided an advantage. Powell explained that “it would be
presumptuous” for one of Carter’s young top aides to interrogate senior Democratic
politicians.42)
On June 9, Carter became the apparent nominee. Facing questions about his
running mate search, he said that he would probably not announce his choice until the
Democratic National Convention in New York, July 12-15.43 The Carter campaign feared
the convention would be boring and thought the selection of a running mate might add
some “suspense.” By drawing out the process, Carter “played it for what it was worth.”44
At the time, presidential candidates did not typically campaign publicly between
securing the nomination (which occurred at the conventions) and Labor Day – allowing
Carter to devote much of his time to choosing a running mate.45 Furthermore, Carter
benefited from the continuing GOP nomination battle between President Gerald Ford and
former California Governor Ronald Reagan. Without needing to campaign, Carter shifted
to a mature selection process while the Republicans fought.46 And, most important,
Carter believed that he had a responsibility to make the best possible decision.47 The
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recent failures of vice presidential selection loomed large. One New York Times piece
observed that “No more Eagletons, no more Agnews,” became “a staff motto.”48
Within the first week of June, Carter narrowed the list to 24 names, then to 14,
and began polling on the candidates.49 On June 14, Carter began reading “large
notebooks,” which contained more detailed biographies, voting records, political
analysis, and press articles.50 The next day he began surveying about 45 “distinguished
Americans” by phone.51
On June 17, Carter and his team held their first formal meetings on the vice
presidential nomination.52 They promised a written statement outlining the procedures,
but dropped that idea within a week.53 Although polling on 14 names, the campaign
leaked 16 names to The New York Times. As the Times piece clarified, “it is known that
the size of his list is essentially cosmetic. Most of those on it are not in serious contention
for final consideration.”54 Newsweek took the analysis one step further, observing that
Carter included women, African Americans, mayors, and liberals to appeal to important
party constituencies.55
By June 20, Carter had settled on eight finalists: Senators Edmund Muskie of
Maine, John Glenn of Ohio, Walter Mondale of Minnesota, Henry Jackson of
48
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Washington, Frank Church of Idaho, Adlai Stevenson III of Illinois, Abraham Ribicoff of
Connecticut, and Representative Peter Rodino Jr. of New Jersey.56 (Carter had met
individually with Muskie, Jackson, and Ribicoff, among other senators, on a late June trip
to Washington, D.C.57) Ribicoff withdrew from consideration early in the process.58
At the end of June, the campaign asked executive officers at Atlanta papers to
discuss the candidates with journalistic colleagues in the candidates’ home states and to
pass along relevant information.59 Powell also called candidates’ hometown politicians
and journalists directly to ask, “What’s the story?” and Kirbo conferred with party leaders
in Washington. Kirbo then began interviews with candidates in Washington, D.C. 60 He
discussed general political and philosophical issues and principles with each candidate
for about an hour, and left a two- or three-page questionnaire.61
Carter, Kirbo, Jordan, Powell, and former U.S. Circuit Court Judge Griffin Bell
developed the questionnaire based on criteria that were important to Carter and
experiences of previous national tickets.62 Carter explained: “We’ve very carefully
evolved a complete list of questions that I think are very probing and complete. They
involve attitudes toward the [draft Democratic] platform, [and] financial investments,
previous contributions or other actions which may be some embarrassment.”63 Kirbo
described them as “quite probing and quite personal questions,” adding to the list
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“income-tax returns, health, marital problems.”64 The last subject related to a concern he
expressed to The New York Times “about the scope of the recent sex scandals on Capitol
Hill,” (referring to recent scandals involving prominent Congressmen Wilbur Mills and
Wayne Hays).65 According to The New York Times, the questionnaire also addressed
“experiences in civil and criminal courtrooms,” and “mental balance.”66 Two of the
financial questions were:
Have your federal or state tax returns been the subject of any audit or
investigation or inquiry at any time? If so, explain.
and
Has a tax lien or other collection procedure ever been instituted against
you by federal, state or local authorities? If so, please give full details.67
A team of lawyers and Arthur Andersen & Co. accountants reviewed the
candidates’ financial reports.68 The questionnaire concluded with the infamous “Eagleton
question:”
Without details, is there or has there been anything in your personal life
which you feel, if known, may be of embarrassment in the Presidential
election this year in the event you should be a candidate?
What about any near relative?69
The campaign began collecting questionnaires July 5.70 Muskie declined to return the
questionnaire, believing that as a former governor, senior senator, and 1968 vice
presidential nominee, he had already undergone vetting. The Los Angeles Times observed
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that Muskie “apparently did not hurt himself with Carter by declining to fill out the
form.”71
Following a strategy session with Kirbo, Jordan, and Powell on July 3, Powell
briefed reporters.72 In the following days, Carter would interview the final candidates at
his home in Plains. Although willing to meet candidates in Atlanta, Washington, New
York, or their homes, he preferred Plains because there he enjoyed more privacy and
comfort.73 At this stage, The New York Times reported, “A highly knowledgeable source
said that the three men with the best chances of being selected by Mr. Carter were
[Glenn, Church, and Mondale].”74 While remaining tight-lipped on details, the campaign
would announce the meetings as they happened. The Los Angeles Times explained that
“Carter had decided to disclose the names one by one so that if he chose to add someone
else at the end of the interview period, the person would not be publicly placed in a
different category from the others.” Powell also announced that the campaign would
disclose the names of all remaining candidates by the end of the week and would not
honor any request from a candidate to keep their inclusion secret. The same L.A. Times
piece remarked:
The reasons for this seem clear. Carter is eager to give the press and public
a chance to comment on the relative merits of the contenders before he
announces his final choice […] Not only will Carter thus get some reading
on public reaction to the various possibilities but he stands a greater
chance of finding out if there is any devastatingly negative information on
any of them.75
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Ed Muskie and his wife arrived in Plains in the early morning hours of Monday,
July 5 and joined Carter for a brief press conference.76 According to Newsweek Muskie
and Carter “huddled for an hour then and four more the next day, beginning with a 9 a.m.
wake-up knock by the ex-governor himself at Muskie’s guest-room door.”77 Around
noon, Carter and Muskie took a walk around the small town, shaking hands and chatting
with reporters in a strolling press conference. They described their sessions as focused
not on policy issues or Muskie’s qualifications, but on the presidency, the vice
presidency, and relations with Congress. Although heartened by this interest, Muskie
harbored some doubt about joining the ticket, knowing he would have to give up his
Senate seat. “My view is that I don’t make any decision until Governor Carter has made a
decision.” The New York Times reported that Carter concluded Muskie was well
qualified. 78
On the morning of Thursday, July 8, Fritz and Joan Mondale arrived in Plains to
meet the Carters. Mondale and Carter discussed various issues, especially civil rights and
forced school busing.79 Their conversation then turned to the structure of the vice
presidency. Informed by his close relationship with former Vice President Hubert
Humphrey, Mondale shared Carter’s interest in developing a stronger, more active office.
Carter told him: “I think some presidents in the past were uncomfortable with the
presence of their own vice president. They were worried about their mortality, and their
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vice president only reminded them of it.” But, he added, he did not share that
discomfort.80 Mondale impressed Carter with his preparation. Carter recalled:
I asked him a question: What do you think the relation ought to be
between the Vice President and the President? He knew what he wanted to
say. He’d carefully considered it and he knew that relationship. And I said,
“What do you think the relationship ought to be between the Vice
President and the Cabinet?” He had a very thorough, carefully considered
answer. Same thing about foreign affairs, same thing about
interrelationships with Congress. He had thought about nuances of
difference about a Vice President’s impact dealing with the senators and
House members.81
In his initial interview with Kirbo, Mondale mentioned that he had “mild”
hypertension rendered harmless by medication. In Plains, Mondale and Carter discussed
the condition and Mondale delivered a report from his physician explaining it.82
Mondale’s physician told the press that besides his blood pressure, Mondale enjoyed
“absolutely top-notch health.”83
Carter and Mondale’s conversation also touched on concerns that Mondale may
not have the drive for a national campaign. When Mondale abandoned his own nascent
presidential bid in late 1974, he explained, “I do not have the overwhelming desire to be
President which is essential for the kind of campaign that is required.”84 He also
famously said “I don’t want to spend the next two years in Holiday Inns.”85 But, as a New
York Times piece described, to Carter “what were agonies for Mr. Mondale are not the
price of political life but the pleasure. [Carter] is a grinding, ground-level campaigner of
the pre-electronic era.” The article quoted Carter saying “Running for President has not
80
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been an ordeal for me.”86 According to Newsweek, Mondale’s apparent squeamishness
for the campaign made him “suspect in Carter’s Spartan eyes.” The “guts question” was
reportedly the main focus of Mondale’s interview with Kirbo.87 But, Carter later
explained, in their interview Mondale contended that “had he thought he maintained a
chance to be President he would have stuck with the race.” This new tactical insight
eased Carter’s concerns.88
Carter and Mondale then walked through downtown Plains into a peanut field,
discussing their backgrounds. Mondale later concluded that “it was a test—this was his
community and these were his people and he wanted to see how I reacted.”89 At the end
of their stroll, they talked to the press at the railroad depot. The New York Times reported
that “Carter dismissed as unfounded” the notion that Mondale “was too liberal to be a
compatible Vice-Presidential running mate.”90 He claimed “almost complete
compatibility between us on the basic issues that face our country,” but also asserted that
he had no interest in a vice president “who would be subservient to me or so flexible that
they could accommodate any position that I might take that would be different from their
own.”91
The press conference also addressed questions about the rigors of the campaign.
Carter declared that “there’s no doubt in my mind” that Mondale would embrace the
grind of the campaign.92 Mondale responded to a question about his Holiday Inn
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comments, joking “I’ve checked, and they’ve all been redecorated. They’re marvelous
places to stay.”93 The Los Angeles Times reported “Mondale openly declared that he
wanted to be Carter’s running mate.”94
After Mondale’s departure, John Glenn and his wife visited Plains to spend the
afternoon with Carter. Glenn arrived amid considerable hype.95 But, as the media often
reported, Glenn was a freshman senator with 18 months of experience in politics and
virtually no background in foreign affairs.96 The pair discussed major policy issues and
the institution of the vice presidency, but Glenn seemed unprepared.97
Carter spent Friday in Plains preparing his nomination acceptance speech and
fishing.98 On Saturday, he departed for New York for the convention and the campaign
completed a poll on voters’ preference among the seven finalists. Rodino performed the
best, followed by Muskie, with Mondale “either third or fourth,” the Los Angeles Times
reported.99
As Carter arrived in New York, according to The New York Times, “there was a
growing consensus among politicians that he would select either [Mondale, Glenn, or
Muskie]. Furthermore, Mr. Carter talked frequently with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of
Minnesota by telephone in the last week, which seemed to point toward Mr. Mondale,
who entered politics as a Humphrey protégé.”100
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Organized labor – a key traditional Democratic constituency – strongly supported
Mondale. He had strong ties to the unions, reinforced by many labor leaders’ loyalty to
Humphrey.101 One AFL-CIO vice president told the Los Angeles Times “Mondale would
be a symbol for us of Carter’s real political stance.” The New York Times reported that
“many party traditionalists” promoted Muskie, “to remedy [Carter’s] weakness among
Roman Catholics.”102 House Democrats pushed Representative Thomas Foley of
Washington, who had not been on Carter’s original list of 16.103 Several black leaders in
the Democratic Party urged Carter to select a black running mate – L.A. Mayor Tom
Bradley in particular.104 Another black group held a press conference to advance
Representative John Conyers Jr. of Michigan.105 Representative Barbara Jordan of Texas
staged a press conference during the convention to “disavow” emerging efforts to
nominate her after activists circulated petitions for her nomination and New York
Representative Bella Abzug declared Jordan her first choice for the nomination.106
Saturday night, Carter met with Henry Jackson for two-and-a-half hours at the
campaign’s headquarters hotel in New York.107 They discussed the Middle East, defense
spending, and energy, among other subjects. In their subsequent press conference, Carter
and Jackson expressed agreement on defense spending cuts, despite Jackson’s reputation
as a hawk. Carter also revealed that Jackson was the first candidate invited to discuss the
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vice presidency, although previous obligations had kept Jackson from visiting Plains.
Carter insisted that he had still not made a decision.108 But the Los Angeles Times piece
observed, “Neither Jackson nor Carter gave any indication by their expression or words
that they were taking the occasion all that seriously.”109
On Sunday, July 11, Carter met with Peter Rodino for an hour and fifteen
minutes. When they addressed reporters, Carter commended Rodino’s leadership
presiding over the Nixon impeachment proceedings as chair of the House Judiciary
Committee. He declared, “I certainly find Congressman Rodino to be qualified [for the
presidency] in every respect.”110 The next day, however, Rodino saw Carter again and
removed himself from consideration, citing, in The New York Times’ language, “recurring
glaucoma that requires periodic treatment and would impair his ability to campaign.”111
In this meeting, Rodino supported Mondale’s nomination.112 In his presidential memoir,
Carter wrote that Rodino withdrew himself because of his wife’s health, not his own.113
Carter met with Frank Church on the morning of Monday, July 12, the first day of
the convention. After their 90-minute meeting, Carter praised Church’s foreign policy
expertise and expressed “great admiration for him,” acknowledging that Church defeated
Carter in several primaries. Carter also discussed his intention to reevaluate the U.S.
intelligence community if elected – an area in which Church had demonstrated
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expertise.114 In The New York Times’ estimation, “Senator Church, normally among the
most articulate of men, seemed strangely subdued and uncomfortable” during the press
conference.115
That afternoon, Carter held his final vice presidential interview, with Adlai
Stevenson III. As with Church, they met for about 90 minutes before adjourning to a
press conference.116 In the press conference, Stevenson faced questions about his
supposed “dullness.” The New York Times reported, “Stevenson gamely and wittily
parried” these queries.117 Carter joked, “I consider dullness part of the compatibility, not
part of the contrast.” As only Mondale had yet done, Stevenson confirmed his
unequivocal interest. The Los Angeles Times noted that “there seemed to be an unusually
warm rapport between the two.”118
Carter spent Tuesday working on his acceptance speech and considering the vice
presidential selection. The campaign polled a large swath of its staff, yielding
“overwhelming” support for Mondale.119 Kirbo met with Glenn once more to discuss
reports of potential improprieties in the Senator’s financial and tax records.120 Carter told
The New York Times, “Obviously I am boiling it down in my mind. I am in that process.
But I haven’t eliminated anyone.” Carter spent the evening watching the convention
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proceedings on television with Kirbo and began his “sorting process.”121 But Carter still
intended to gather all his notes and “do the reviewing tomorrow.”122 Following the
interview process, the rankings appeared to hold Mondale leading, followed by Muskie,
Glenn, Stevenson, and Church. Jackson (and Rodino before he dropped out) appeared the
least likely.123 The campaign conducted a poll of the Alabama and Georgia delegations to
gauge the potential Southern response to liberal and northern candidates.124
By the morning of Wednesday, July 14, Carter had “one man pre-eminent in my
mind. It’s conceivable that I’ll change my mind—I’m not positive yet—but I don’t think
so.”125 That afternoon he met with nine Democratic governors who largely supported
Mondale for the second spot. Carter changed earlier plans to inform the finalists of their
status 24 hours in advance, instead deciding to call them right before his news conference
scheduled for Thursday at 10 a.m.126 The Carter campaign had the Secret Service install
direct telephone lines to the hotel rooms of three of the finalists.127
On the morning of Thursday, July 15, the press focused on Mondale and Muskie
as the likely choice.128 At 8:26 a.m., Carter called Mondale to ask, “Would you like to
run with me?”129 An hour and a half later, he told a press conference at his hotel, “I have
two announcements to make. One is that I’ve decided to accept the nomination of
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President. And the other one is that I’ve asked to serve as my running mate—if the
delegates will approve—Senator Walter Mondale from Minnesota.”130
Carter’s process received mixed reviews during and after. One New York Times
article remarked at the start of the convention, “It is increasingly clear that the prolonged
and laborious selection process that Mr. Carter has adopted was a serious effort to gather
and assess evidence and not an exercise in political courtesy or contrived suspense for the
press.”131 A Newsweek piece claimed, “The search won Carter points for prudence,” and
called it “far more extensive and sophisticated than that employed by most Presidential
nominees.”132 The New York Times thrice praised Carter’s process in editorials, asserting
that without dramatic reform of the process, Carter’s procedure “is probably the best that
could be worked out.”133
But many observers believed Carter’s process to be solely performance. Some
dismissed it as “lip service” to the acknowledged challenges of the vice presidency; one
Newsweek story wrote that Carter “uttered the proper seasonal commonplaces” about
choosing his vice president differently and changing the vice presidency.134 In 1992,
Democratic nominee Governor Bill Clinton called Carter’s procedure “the Noah’s Ark
routine.”135 A Los Angeles Times article declared, “Carter’s search for a vice presidential
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nominee has been one of the most unusual in history.”136 Still coverage from all corners
used language like “elaborate,” “mindful,” “deliberate,” “thorough,” “painstaking,”
“methodical,” “sound,” and “a striking contrast to the hurried and soon-disastrous VicePresidential selection made at the 1972 convention.”137
After the election, Carter and Mondale expanded and clarified their earlier ideas
about the vice presidency and devised a new model. Mondale became a crucial general
advisor in the Carter White House, totally integrated in the executive branch. Scholars
and pundits credit the Carter-Mondale partnership with igniting the emergence of the vice
presidency as an office of substantive responsibilities and political relevance. Their
relationship shaped the institution for all subsequent vice presidents, and was only
possible because of the care Carter took in selecting his partner.
The innovations Mondale and Carter instituted are prerogatives that contemporary
vice presidents take for granted, including participation in all Cabinet, NSC, and
Economic Policy Group meetings; a standing invitation to all political meetings;
inclusion in all of the president’s paper flow; a weekly private lunch; direct placement of
staff within the national security and domestic policy operations; a permanent Capitol
Hill staff; and a West Wing office.138
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Carter and Mondale’s partnership was good for both men, as well as for the
institution of the vice presidency.139 According to political scientist Paul Kengor,
Mondale’s “lauded loyalty to the president” was rewarded with Carter’s consideration of
his vice president as “his most senior adviser.” The two also became close personal
friends, with Carter calling Mondale “like a brother and a son,” and Mondale remarking,
“Never before has a vice president been so generously and so kindly treated by his
president.” Finally, “Mondale considered the role he played in elevating the stature of the
vice presidency his greatest contribution during the Carter years.”140 Scholars Thomas E.
Cronin and Michael A. Genovese sum up the academic consensus: “Mondale is credited
with being perhaps the first in that job who regularly exercised substantive policy
influence.”141 Carter and Mondale left a legacy of methodical vice presidential selection
against which future processes would be judged.

Since Carter
Reagan secured the Republican nomination nearly two months in advance of the
1980 Republican National Convention and began considering his running mate choice
then.142 His campaign disavowed Carter’s public process, saying “The one thing the
Governor doesn’t want to do, is have a re-enactment of Plains in which a lot of people
were put through the humiliation of coming as supplicants to the farm country in Plains at
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all hours of the day and night.”143 Still, like Carter, the Reagan campaign conducted
public opinion polling and some form of background checks, and planned the
announcement for the last day of the convention.144 But Reagan’s team spent most of
their time in the days before the announcement trying to structure a “co-presidency” by
nominating former president Ford for vice president. When that effort collapsed, Reagan
chose George H.W. Bush the traditional way: at the last minute in a convention hotel
suite.145 Despite the pick’s compressed timeframe, it was made with greater care than the
Eagleton decision. Bush’s previous high profile positions required rigorous vetting. He
served as Ambassador to the United Nations and Director of Central Intelligence – both
jobs which required Senate confirmation and conferred top levels of security clearance.
And as a rival in the 1980 nomination fight, the Reagan campaign had conducted
opposition research on him.
In 1984, Walter Mondale’s vice presidential selection process evoked Carter’s
procedures. In an early campaign memo on selection, Mondale’s closest aide
recommended many specific aspects of the Carter model, writing, “I think you should
approach the process in the same way.”146 As Mondale conducted his search, observers
often compared it to the 1976 system that elevated him to the national ticket.147 (These
comparisons proved faulty in the coming weeks as the media reported a string of apparent
financial improprieties on the part of Ferraro and her husband. As the controversy
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mounted, Mondale’s campaign chairman admitted that the campaign spent only 48 hours
reviewing the family’s finances.148)
In 1988 and since, both parties’ nominees’ procedures resembled Carter’s more
than anything that had come before.

Barack Obama
Despite its distinctive context, the Carter model became virtually standard. Some
elements have changed over time and some change campaign-to-campaign. Illinois
Senator Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign employed a derivative process in
choosing his running mate. As the most recent successful presidential ticket, it represents
a meaningful example through which to evaluate the contemporary vice presidential
selection process.
As Obama wrapped up his messy primary campaign victory over New York
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton in May, he began planning his vice presidential search.
On June 4, the day after he clinched the Democratic nomination, he announced his threeperson vetting committee.149 Washington lawyer Jim Johnson helped run Mondale’s 1984
campaign and ran the running mate search for Kerry in 2004; he would lead the Obama
effort as well. Former Clinton Justice Department official Eric Holder and recent Obama
confidant and ally Caroline Kennedy made up the rest of the team.150 Johnson soon left
the process after a controversy erupted over a favorable mortgage rate he received from
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Countrywide Financial.151 Obama campaign manager David Plouffe said the job of the
vetting team was to “manage a network of attorneys, all volunteers, who would work
around the clock to complete a thorough examination of potential VP candidates [and to]
meet with party leaders to get their confidential ideas on nominees.”152 Their
investigation of candidates included research of public records, personal questionnaires,
and interviews with family members, friends, and associates. The only other participants
in the selection process were Obama, Plouffe, and chief strategist David Axelrod.153
The small group held their first formal meeting on vice presidential selection in
early June, secluded in a hotel conference room near their campaign headquarters in
Chicago. At the meeting, they discussed, according to Plouffe, “every Democratic
governor and senator, some House members, prominent mayors, business leaders, and
some military leaders.” From this collection, they constructed a preliminary list of
approximately 20 people, “a mix of state, local, and federal elected officials; some former
elected officials; and a former military person or two.” Hillary Rodham Clinton was on
the list.154 Obama chatted with Plouffe daily, and by the next meeting, a couple of weeks
later at Holder’s office, they narrowed the list to about 10.155 In July, the campaign
conducted focus-group-testing on potential candidates.156 The next meeting at Holder’s
office winnowed the list to six. By early August, it was down to three: Senators Joseph
Biden of Delaware and Evan Bayh of Indiana, and Governor Tim Kaine of Virginia.157
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In the next step, Obama interviewed the candidates one-on-one. This required
involving Alyssa Mastromonaco, the campaign’s director of scheduling and advance,
who coordinated the sub rosa sessions. Plouffe recalled an interview procedure much
different from Carter’s highly-publicized system:
The meetings all took place on the road, at hotels Barack happened to be
in for the night. The “targets,” as we called the VP contenders, were flown
in very early, squired to the hotel before Obama and the road show
arrived, secreted in through back and basement entrances, bunkered in a
room they could not leave, and then furtively evacuated after the meeting
through an alternate exit so no press would see them on their way out.158
Obama met Bayh in St. Louis, Kaine in a small Indiana town, and Biden in
Minneapolis.159 As the candidate set off for a brief vacation, he dispatched Plouffe and
Axelrod to meet with the finalists. In one day, they met with Biden at home in Delaware,
Bayh on vacation in West Virginia, and Kaine at the Governor’s mansion in Virginia.160
They reported to Obama that all three would be strong picks, with clear advantages and
potential drawbacks. But they slightly favored Biden.161
In the final days of the process, the media reported that Biden, Bayh, and Kaine,
were the most probable nominees, with Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius, and perhaps
Clinton remaining in contention.162 When Obama returned from Hawaii on August 17, he
told Plouffe and Axelrod that he had decided to select Biden. On Thursday, August 21, he
informed Biden, who immediately accepted. Two days later, Obama announced his
running mate directly to supporters by text message. That afternoon he and Biden and
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held a rally at the Old State Capitol in Springfield, Illinois, where Obama announced his
campaign for president in February 2007.163
Some presidential candidates between Carter and Obama introduced new
elements to the process, with varying degrees of success. Some of these elements became
standard, and some proved peculiarities of the time or candidate.
In 1984, Mondale announced his selection of Representative Geraldine Ferraro in
a specially staged event in the Minnesota House of Representatives four days before the
Democratic National Convention met in San Francisco.164 Since then, only Vice
President George H.W. Bush in 1988 has waited until the convention began to name his
running mate.165 That year, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis invited the
candidates on his short list to appear with him at campaign rallies; he and Carter remain
the only candidates to have their potential running mates publicly audition for the role.166
In 1988, Bush chose Senator Danforth Quayle with virtually no input and no
consultation among staff and advisors until the last moment. This level of secrecy was at
least partially possible because Bush conducted no interviews with candidates. Although
no subsequent nominee has guarded his thinking to the same degree, the Bush
campaign’s official silence on the nature of the process and its subjects became the
standard posture for campaigns to take.167 Accordingly, four years later, Bill Clinton
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became the first nominee to conduct clandestine interviews with potential vice
presidential candidates.168
In the eight presidential elections since 1976, nine elements have emerged as
standard parts of successful vice presidential selection:
•

Time – Presumptive presidential nominees typically start their processes
two or three months before their nominating conventions.

•

Dedicated vetters – Campaigns appoint either a team of campaign
outsiders, or detail campaign staff to focus exclusively on the selection
and no other aspects of the campaign.

•

Small circle – Beyond the vetters, the day-to-day campaign staff and
advisors involved in the decision are limited to a small number of senior
figures like campaign managers, chairs, and chief strategists. But the circle
is not too small – it needs to allow some dissent and to use collective
judgment to check raw intuition.

•

Vetting – Campaigns conduct lawyer- and accountant-driven reviews of
candidates’ information. Usually collected in questionnaires, the topics
include financial, medical, legal, political, and personal history. The
survey typically concludes with the catchall “Eagleton question.”

•

Polling – Campaigns conduct public opinion polls on potential running
mates to determine their name recognition, favorability, and political
coloration.
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•

Interviews – Potential running mates interview first with senior campaign
officials or vetters. The final candidates for the position interview one-onone with the presidential candidate.

•

Secrecy – Campaigns conduct the search with little or no official public
comment. Candidates are not discussed on the record and the specifics of
the process are kept as shielded as possible until the grand reveal.

•

Disclosure of short list – Despite official secrecy, campaigns leak the
names of those they are seriously considering in order to measure possible
media and popular response and encourage media scrutiny before it is too
late.

•

Announcement event – Presidential candidates now introduce their
running mates at media events staged specifically for this purpose. Such
events often have some touch of gimmick that separates them from typical
rallies. In 1988, Vice President George H.W. Bush announced his running
mate at an elaborate waterfront rally at which he arrived by riverboat.169 In
2004, Senator John Kerry announced his running mate by unveiling the
new Kerry-Edwards logo on the side of his campaign plane.170

Although these components represent the typical selection playbook, they do not suggest
strict adherence. For instance, Obama interviewed his final candidates before his advisors
did so. But departure from these steps has hurt candidates before. In 1988 George H.W.
Bush suffered for skipping interviews, consulting too few people, and not leaking the
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name until immediately before the announcement. In 2008, John McCain’s problematic
selection of Alaska Governor Sarah Palin resulted from thin vetting and involving too
many people in his thinking – which led to leaks that limited his options.171 (The
problems of these running mates will be addressed in Chapter III.)
Today’s selection process emerged over decades of trial and error. Since the 1972
election, presidential candidates responded to the lessons of previous candidates with new
approaches. As presidential candidates became the central figures in vice presidential
selection, voters and the media began to hold candidates accountable for their choices.
The next chapters address the changes in selection criteria that resulted from changes in
the selection process.
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CHAPTER II
Bolster, Not Balance: Rethinking the Selection Metaphor
“Balance” has been the defining reference point in vice presidential selection for
most of American history. But this framework has remained the same even as the vice
presidency and vice presidential selection processes have changed. Contrast on national
tickets remains a component of campaign strategy, but “balance” merits reevaluation.
Must candidate contrast still denote ticket balance? How does that contrast shape the
campaign and contribute to winning?

Balance by the Numbers
Jody Baumgartner discusses balance in his chapter on vice presidential selection,
and examines the relationship between balance and victory in the vice presidency’s
“modern era.” His modern era begins with the 1960 election, because “this was the first
year that both presidential candidates selected their own vice presidential candidates,”
and it has been that way since.1 Although this standard proves problematic for defining
eras of the vice presidency itself, it is meaningful for evaluating vice presidential
selection, candidacies, and campaigns.
Baumgartner evaluates the “balance” of modern presidential tickets (through
2004) with six criteria: diversity, region, ideology, experience, faction, and personal
traits. Politically salient traits and political coloration are not simple to measure, and
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Baumgartner’s categories exaggerate some trends and miss others. For instance, he
includes age in “personal characteristics” along with personal/familial reputation and
style on the stump. In this context, age would be more appropriately attached to other
demographic measures within “diversity.” That category includes religion, gender, and
“racial or ethnic background,” but Baumgartner discusses ethnicity through 2004 in a
way that contemporary observers would see as anachronistic. He includes “a focus on
particular salient issues” in his evaluation of “ideology,” but also mentions that “a
presidential candidate may be lacking in a particular area of policy expertise” as he
describes balancing “experience.” Nevertheless, Baumgartner introduces a meaningful
lens for evaluating national tickets. His most important claim holds that, according to his
metrics, “the more balanced ticket won every election through 1984 and lost every
election since 1988.”2
A reorganization of Baumgartner’s categories illuminates other trends. His six
broad categories should be regrouped, expanded, and distilled into three general
categories that can be evaluated against more specific sub-criteria. (Charts corresponding
to the following analysis on balance are included as an appendix.)
Baumgartner’s “diversity” category includes assorted concepts that are not alike.
These “identity” markers – gender, race, religion, and ethnicity deserve separate
attention. Age (or generational diversity) belongs in this identity category as well.*
Ethnicity here follows from the definition of presidential scholars Joseph A. Pika and
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John Anthony Maltese. They contend that before 1960, all presidential and vice
presidential candidates had to “hail from English ethnic stock.”3
Baumgartner lumps many possible differences of experience into one general
category. But experiential balance can be evaluated by several different criteria: duration
of experience, experience at different levels of government (national, state, local),
experience within different branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial), and
experience in foreign or domestic policy.
The remaining relevant criteria can go into a “politics” category. The crucial
political characteristics of national tickets include region, association with an opposing
candidate of a primary battle, ideology (strictly along the liberal-moderate-conservative
spectrum), and insider-outsider status.4
Baumgartner’s general point holds up: viewed as quantifiable elements across the
last 50 years, the “more” balanced tickets tended to win through the 1984 election and
lose since. But the Obama-Biden ticket won in 2008, despite being “more” balanced than
McCain-Palin.
Despite the frequent chatter about the potential benefits of demographic diversity
on the national ticket, identity politics in presidential campaigns has a tepid history. Of
the 26 national tickets since 1960, ten have included a non-Protestant, non-white, or
female candidate. Of those ten, only two have won – the first, Kennedy-Johnson, and the
most recent, Obama-Biden.
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The goal of regional balance seems to persist, as do varieties of experience. But
both have become so standard as to be obvious. Local and state governments have long
been common first steps in a political career. Of the 33 presidential and vice presidential
candidates since 1960, 20 have started their careers in subnational government – so
creating a ticket that includes both national and subnational government experience
comes relatively easily.5 Because most tickets have had such experience – like regional
balance – it indicates little about a ticket’s potential success. But narrowing the question
to the most recent position held prior to presidential and vice presidential nomination
reveals the potential benefit of having both immediate national and subnational
experience on a ticket. In the 13 presidential elections since 1960, such tickets have
prevailed nine times and lost only three times.
Only once in the modern era has a presidential ticket lacked a candidate with
military service: Obama-Biden in 2008. Sargent Shriver was the only major-party vice
presidential nominee in the modern era who did not serve in elected office prior to his
candidacy.
While ideology remains a crucial element in vice presidential selection,
ideologically aligned, rather than balanced tickets have won the last five elections,
starting in 1992. But all of those tickets have been balanced with both a Washington
“insider” and “outsider.” Only one such ticket has lost, McCain-Palin in 2008.* But
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Beltway fixture John McCain ran as a “maverick” who bucked the ways of Washington.
They lost to an ideologically aligned/inside-outside ticket. (All but one of those tickets
has featured generational balance; the exception was Clinton and Gore – who were both
among the youngest holders of their offices.) So a holistic application of political
“balance” may now entail thematic alignment in some cases.
Baumgartner’s empirical approach to evaluating balance raises several important
questions, as do his claims about the impact of balance. How did the “balance” trump
card become a losing hand? Did it even win elections in the first place, as Baumgartner
and the conventional wisdom suggest? What happened between the 1984 and 1988
elections to change the effect of ticket balance? Why do candidates and campaigns
continue to seek these forms of balance if, as Baumgartner apparently demonstrates, they
do not yield electoral success?
The inability of the Baumgartner approach to address these questions teaches
something about the subject itself. First, balance is nearly impossible to quantify
precisely. For instance, Obama and Biden shared the same type of experience (the U.S.
Senate and subnational legislatures), the same gender, and similar political stances. But
they differed in race, religion, and age. McCain and Palin shared the “maverick” label
and Western roots, but differed in gender, type and level of experience, and age. There is
no unassailable way to determine which ticket was “more balanced.” Second, the
ahistorical, one-size-fits-all approach disregards campaigns’ contexts. The American
political environment changes rapidly. It requires different strategies from different
candidates at different times. “Balance” in vice presidential selection was once a simple
Reid Wilson, “McCain’s Shift Makes Him Senate’s Most Conservative,” National Journal, February 24,
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and broad requisite; when party organizations held sole authority in nominating the
national ticket, the principle of “balance” kept the parties together. But changes in the
presidential nomination process, post-nomination presidential campaigns, and American
political alignment have undermined the primacy of ticket “balance” in constructing a
ticket. If balance remains an important criterion, it may now be a particular approach,
applied on a case-by-case basis to shore up specific weaknesses, extend the presidential
nominee’s narrative, broaden the ticket’s appeal, and round out the intellectual core of the
nascent White House team.

Traditional Balance
The language of “balance” on the national ticket is a relic of the parties’ heyday,
when parties ran presidential campaigns. Conventions determined the nominees –
Democrats even required a two-thirds vote for theirs – and the party faithful carried out
the electioneering. Party loyalty drove voting decisions, and candidates behaved
accordingly. But the parties were often split by ideology, regional tensions, personal
loyalties, and dramatic policy differences. Historian Allan Peskin describes the
challenges of this “golden age of political partisanship:”
The very importance of parties as institutions intensified the internal
struggle to control the party’s machinery and shape its program. Yet, at the
same time, the political imperatives of an era characterized by high voter
turnout, straight ticket voting, and close national elections dictated a
strategy of mobilizing one’s own adherents rather than persuading
the unpersuaded. Since one disgruntled faction could deprive the national
ticket of victory by sitting on its hands, party managers were compelled to
devote the bulk of their energies to securing party unity and
enthusiasm. [emphasis added] 6
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A promise to “balance” the ticket with the second spot could mollify a powerful faction,
thus securing the nomination, unified party support through Election Day, and quite
possibly sustained loyalty until the next cycle. Factions existed primarily along
ideological and regional lines, as well as on some specific policy questions – but these
factors often converged.
In 1880, for instance, Representative James Garfield defeated former President
Ulysses S. Grant for the Republican presidential nomination. Garfield emerged as a
compromise candidate amid a bitter convention in which the powerful Stalwart faction,
led by New York Senator Roscoe Conkling, fought to nominate Grant for a third term.
Republicans still needed to win New York, and could not do so without the Stalwarts’
support. But, according to historian Thomas C. Reeves, “Conkling had little liking for
Garfield, [who] had revealed a degree of affinity” for opposing factions. So the
convention turned to Chester A. Arthur, “Conkling’s chief lieutenant” and “a loyal
Stalwart,” who accepted the party’s nomination for vice president. In the following
months, Arthur worked closely with Conkling, Grant, and other Stalwarts to coordinate
an aggressive national campaign on behalf of the Republican ticket.7
In 1892, former President Grover Cleveland of New York won the Democratic
nomination to return to the White House. Although he continued to support the gold
standard, the party began veering toward Free Silver. In an effort to shore up the
emerging Silverite element, the party nominated former Illinois Representative and
assistant postmaster general Adlai Stevenson for vice president. Senate historian Mark O.
Hatfield explains, “As a supporter of using greenbacks and free silver to inflate the
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currency and alleviate economic distress in the rural districts, Stevenson balanced the
ticket headed by Cleveland.”8 Historian Leonard Schlup expanded:
Cleveland forged a political alliance with Stevenson in 1892 in order to
strengthen his chance of carrying Illinois and to placate southern farmers,
upset with his sound money policies, who were flirting with the Populist
party and its stand on transportation, land, and currency. Although
Stevenson endorsed the conservative Democratic platform, he had
acquired a reputation as a former greenbacker and a proponent of silver
coinage. Cleveland expected Stevenson to campaign in the South
displaying these credentials.9
By 1900, Stevenson returned to the national ticket, again nominated for vice president as
a link between the Democrats’ emerging Populist strain “and the regular element of the
party.” 10 But, as Schlup describes, Stevenson played a very different role in 1900:
“Nominated in 1892 as a liberal to balance a slate led by a conservative, the rehabilitated
Stevenson obtained renomination in 1900 as an elder conservative spokesman to equalize
a ticket headed by a progressive.”11 This time Stevenson joined Silverite populist William
Jennings Bryan, Cleveland’s rival, on the Democratic ticket.*
The turn of the twentieth century saw the beginning of large shifts in presidential
campaigning. These changes in turn changed the vice presidency. In the 1896 campaign,
Democratic presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan delivered over 800 speeches in
27 states, more than any other candidate up to that time.12 Republican nominee William
McKinley did not match Bryan’s travel, but also dealt with voters in an unprecedented
8
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fashion. McKinley’s team conducted a “front porch campaign,” taking to scale an
innovation from President Benjamin Harrison’s 1888 campaign.13 While Bryan toured,
McKinley remained at home in Canton, Ohio, receiving 750,000 visitors from 30 states
on over 300 occasions. When the crowds gathered, McKinley delivered short but
carefully crafted speeches from his porch.14 William D. Harpine observes, “McKinley
somehow created, out of the awesome mass of visitors, parades, and cheering—staged
purely for purposes of the campaign—a feeling that he cared about each visitor, that he
welcomed each one warmly to his home, that their interests were identified with one
another’s and with the Republican cause.”15
In introducing direct campaigning as such, Harpine claims, “McKinley’s
campaign foreshadowed in its construction and in its rhetoric many of the political
methods of the modern technological, mass media age.”16 But more immediately than the
eventual rise of mass media, presidential scholars Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson
explain, the new approaches of both 1896 candidates “foretold the prominence of
candidate- rather than party-centered campaigns.”17 As campaigns changed, they required
different skills and attributes from the candidates. Accordingly, conventions and party
organizations began to coordinate vice presidential nominations with the presidential
nominees. The evolution of campaign tactics and candidate selection – and the
emergence of Vice President Theodore Roosevelt as a powerful national figure – leads
Baumgartner to identify 1900 as the beginning of a “transitional era” of the vice
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presidency. He explains that as “presidential candidates began to assert some control over
the vice presidential selection process [they were able to select] candidates who were
more competent, loyal to, and compatible with their running mates.”18 The traditional
conception of “balance” receded as the critical ticket-building element.

Balance Begins to Fade
In 1932, Democratic National Convention delegates supporting New York
Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt offered the vice presidential nomination to House
Speaker John Nance Garner in exchange for his delegates. Garner released his delegates,
the convention nominated Roosevelt and Garner, and they served two terms together in
the White House.19 By 1940, however, Roosevelt and Garner’s ongoing friction
precluded their continued partnership. As Garner mounted his own campaign for the
Democratic presidential nomination, Roosevelt accepted a draft movement for an
unprecedented third term.20 As discussed in Chapter I, he induced the Democratic
convention to nominate Henry Wallace for vice president in order to put another New
Dealer in the White House. Although Wallace was a former Republican from Iowa, his
selection dismissed balance in favor of policy consistency on the ticket.
In 1960, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy defeated Texan Senate Majority
Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, Missouri Senator Stuart Symington, Minnesota Senator
Hubert Humphrey, and former Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson II for the Democratic
presidential nomination. Democrats anticipated a close election against Vice President
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Richard Nixon, and put great emphasis on the running mate selection – especially
following a bitter and divisive primary. Kennedy’s selection of Johnson balanced the
ticket in crucial ways. As Kennedy confidant Theodore Sorensen explained:
Johnson had the precise biography that a young, relatively inexperienced
Northeastern Catholic liberal needed to balance the Democratic ticket.
Kennedy, somewhat to the left of center, regarded LBJ as somewhat to the
right of center on many issues and a bridge to the Democratic Southerners,
conservatives, and moderates whose support he knew he would ultimately
need in the election and might otherwise have difficulty obtaining.21
But Kennedy also made another, unique calculation in choosing Johnson that had nothing
to do with balance. Sorensen recounts,
In a confidential memorandum to JFK and RFK one week before the 1960
convention, I put Johnson at the top of my list of possible contenders for
the vice presidential slot, noting that he “helps with the farmers,
Southerners and Texas; easier to work with in this position than as
Majority Leader”—where JFK said Johnson “would be just impossible…
Lyndon would screw me all the time.”22
LBJ brought crucial balance to the ticket; his presence likely ensured the Democratic
wins in the South and carried JFK to the White House.23 But in choosing Johnson,
Kennedy looked beyond balance and Johnson’s ability to win his large home state, to the
political implications for a Kennedy presidency.
In 1976, Jimmy Carter introduced the model of running mate selection that
eventually became the standard. As addressed in the previous chapter, crucial elements of
the model include time, direct interviews, media leaks, and scrutiny of candidates’
finances, health, and other personal affairs. When Carter announced Mondale as his
choice, he said that he chose Mondale because of “a great compatibility” between them
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on “the major issues that face our nation,” and that Mondale “would be the best person to
lead this country if something should happen to me.” But he also declared, “I am
determined, beyond what has ever been done in this country, to put major responsibilities
on the Vice President [and] I feel completely compatible with Senator Mondale.” Over
the selection process, Carter prepared for a partnership with his vice president, and that
drove his decision. Carter also acknowledged that Mondale brought certain forms of
balance to the ticket:
He has a broad range of experience, as an Attorney General, as someone
from a Northern Midwestern state, in agriculture, in finance, in social
programs, and a knowledge of Washington. […] He’s also been, as other
Senators, involved in making major decisions concerning international
affairs. 24
While the Mondale selection largely meets the traditional criteria of balance, the process
itself makes it a departure point. Extending the process, subjecting the candidates to
greater scrutiny and discrimination, differentiating the selection from the rest of the
convention narrative, and emphasizing the ticket’s compatibility enable campaigns to
consider and elevate characteristics not covered by the traditional balance criteria. When
Republicans convened a month later, they staged the last major party convention to open
without one presidential candidate controlling a majority of the delegates. With few
exceptions, subsequent running mate selections have followed something like the Carter
model. And, with few exceptions, subsequent tickets have eschewed the traditional model
of balance.
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Balance vs. Brand
The explosion of mass media and the emergence of the campaign as we know it
lessened the need to appeal to voters’ narrow interests and allegiances. Today’s partisan
atmosphere rewards a certain orthodoxy to the parties’ general stances. Campaigns
involve more contrast and less nuance. In this regard, too much “balance” muddles a
campaign’s message and weakens its case against the opposition. With more opportunity
to make their case to voters more directly, parties, candidates, and campaigns began to
rely less on “descriptive” factors in vice presidential selection. Far removed from that
“golden age of political partisanship,” campaigns must now put more resources into
“persuading the unpersuaded,” and less into “securing party unity and enthusiasm,” in the
language of historian Peskin. Campaigns focus on generating consistent messaging,
narrative, and brand to make their cases to voters. Tickets no longer need East Coast and
West Coast representation, or a civil rights supporter and a civil rights opponent.
Examples from the last half-dozen elections illustrate the new framework and
implications of balance – and the perils of disregarding them.
In 1988, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis chose Texas Senator Lloyd
Bentsen as the Democratic vice presidential nominee, following a process based on
Carter’s. The New York Times article on the selection opened, “Michael S. Dukakis
reached for regional and ideological balance today and selected Senator Lloyd Bentsen of
Texas as his running mate, counting on the conservative Democrat to strike at the heart of
Vice President Bush’s Southern base.” The article continued,
Today’s announcement suggested a man who methodically identified his
political shortcomings and tried to mend them: a New Englander who
recognized his vulnerability in the South, a Governor who recognized the
need for Washington experience, a candidate sometimes accused of being
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left of center on foreign policy who recognized the need for philosophical
balance. 25
But in an era in which presidential candidates are responsible for their running mates, the
ideological and policy daylight between Dukakis and Bentsen opened the ticket up to
criticism. The weeks after the announcement saw headlines like “Bentsen’s Pro-Reagan
Votes May Be Problem for Dukakis,” “Bush: Let Dukakis and Bentsen Debate; Vice
President Points to Democrats’ Ideological Differences,” and “Unmatched Set; The
Dukakis-Bentsen Ticket Has an Opinion for Anyone in the Party.”26 Dukakis had to
confront the question “If you oppose ‘x’ on the other ticket, why do you put it next in line
for the presidency?” Bentsen likely helped Dukakis on Election Day, rather than hurt
him, but their losing ticket represents the last occurrence of a traditionally balanced
ticket.
In 1992, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton shattered the traditional balance concept
by selecting Tennessee Senator Al Gore as his running mate. In choosing another young
Southern moderate who championed the same brand of Democratic centrism, the Clinton
campaign consciously avoided the Dukakis-Bentsen split. The Los Angeles Times’
coverage of the selection included an explanation from Clinton’s pollster Stanley
Greenberg:
“The key is definition.” Picking a running mate who dramatically differed
from Clinton would merely confuse voters about what Clinton stands
for—something that many voters already have questions about, he said.
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By contrast, picking a similar running mate will help voters understand
who Clinton is, he said.27
Gore’s profile contrasted with Clinton’s in non-traditional ways, however. While Clinton
was a governor who had never worked in Washington, Gore was the son of a senator,
grew up in Washington, and had served in Congress for 16 years. He enjoyed a “family
man” reputation, which mitigated the downside of Clinton’s marital scandals.28 Although
intended as an attack on the decision, a Bush campaign spokeswoman summed up some
of the beneficial differences on the ticket: “Bill Clinton chose not to serve in the military,
so they chose someone who did. Bill Clinton’s got a lousy environmental record, so they
chose someone known as an environmentalist. I think they feel insecure about traditional
family values and Tipper [Gore, who advocated for warning labels on provocative music]
is a way to make up for that.”29 As Clinton strategist James Carville recounts, the Gore
decision worked:
Gore had been around the track once, he’d run for president. I think
Clinton also felt that picking Gore was different and unexpected. The
drawback was that it was two guys from the same region, but nobody
viewed that as a big problem. […] The more people thought about it, Al
Gore seemed like a pretty good choice: good on the environment, strong
senatorial record, Vietnam War veteran, a moderate who would fit with
Bill Clinton’s New Democrat agenda. A good choice.”30
The famed Newsweek post-election project described the tactics behind the ticket as
“generational and regional pull.”31
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In 2000, Texas Governor George W. Bush tapped former GOP official Dick
Cheney for vice president, in another of the least conventionally balanced tickets of the
modern era.32 Both represented the Republican Party’s conservative wing, both resided in
Texas, and both had ties to oil, and thus an association with energy policy expertise. But
Cheney brought to the ticket serious experience that Bush lacked. Cheney had served as
President Gerald Ford’s White House Chief of Staff, in the House of Representatives for
11 years (including several years in House leadership), and as George H.W. Bush’s
Secretary of Defense, before launching a successful private sector career. 33

A New Framework
At one point, Baumgartner describes balance as “some electorally valuable
characteristic that the vice presidential nominee might bring to the campaign.”34 William
Safire’s eponymous Political Dictionary defines “balanced ticket” as “a slate of
candidates nominated so as to appeal to as many voter groups as possible.”35 These
explanations capture some of today’s ticket constructing tactics, but do so within the
obsolete traditional “balance” framework. The balance metaphor itself proves inherently
problematic. It evokes a seesaw seeking to stay elevated and horizontal. Any element
placed on the seesaw needs to be offset by its equal-weight opposite on the other side.
But achieving equal-weight opposites is difficult – especially because the presidential
nominee’s characteristics almost universally carry more weight than those of the vice
presidential nominee. And even a momentarily balanced seesaw is significantly
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endangered by weather. “Balance” represents an unstable foothold. Instead of balancing
tickets, presidential nominees should bolster them.
Rather than balancing a seesaw, a presidential nominee should build a solid
edifice. The presidential candidate’s crucial characteristics – policy positions, campaign
themes, family history, alliances, loyalties, promises, goals, ideology, identity, record –
constitute blocks in the political brand that drives the campaign’s narrative and
messaging. This structure represents the candidate’s imperative for election. A running
mate should enlarge the edifice in new directions. A presidential nominee should select a
partner who contributes characteristics that add to the ticket without challenging the
extant structure. A running mate’s coloration should take the ticket into uncovered
territory, but connect firmly to the existing blocks. A vice presidential nominee should
extend the presidential nominee’s narrative, carry his message, and reinforce the
imperative driving the campaign. This structure is stable, organic, and sturdy –
predictable in nearly all circumstances.

CHAPTER III
Competence and the “First Presidential Decision”
When balance declined as the primary concern in vice presidential selection, other
criteria emerged in its place. As the presidential nominees’ emerging authority in the
selection process diminished the role of balance, it elevated competence as the major
universal criterion in vice presidential selection. The decision became one of the primary
measures voters use to evaluate presidential nominees’ judgment. And since Carter
introduced a new selection process in 1976, presidential candidates have largely
succeeded in nominating competent running mates.

Throttlebottoms All
In 1976, Jimmy Carter frequently justified his elaborate vice presidential search
process with the explanation that he was looking for the most able successor – and a true
White House partner. Pundits dismissed these claims. James Reston wrote in The New
York Times, for instance, “[Carter] has said all the traditional things [about qualifications
and developing a substantive role]. We have heard all this before […] all [vice
presidents] were promised and finally denied power.”1 But Carter eventually turned back
the tide of skepticism. By the morning of his running mate announcement, The New York
Times observed, “He has earned increasing credibility for his often repeated assertion that
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the overridingly important consideration in his mind is to choose ‘the best person to be
President in case something happens to me.’”2
Political observers had reason to be skeptical. Presidential scholar Michael Nelson
explains, “the early vice presidents make up a virtual rogues’ gallery of personal and
political failures.”3 For example, Vice President George Clinton, the fourth vice president
and a perennial candidate for the office, earned a reputation for ineffectiveness at the
beginning of his tenure in 1805. Senator William Plumer observed that as the Senate’s
presiding officer, Clinton appeared “altogether unacquainted” with the body’s operations,
he “preserve[d] little or no order,” and he displayed a “clumsey awkward way of putting
a question.” Senator John Quincy Adams wrote, “A worse choice than Mr. Clinton could
scarcely have been made.”4 Vice President Millard Fillmore succeeded to the presidency
in 1850, but as one collection of vice presidential trivia explains, remains “remembered
today mostly for not being remembered.”5 Woodrow Wilson’s vice president Thomas
Marshall did famously little, but said a lot about it. He chaired a few Cabinet meetings –
the first vice president to do so since Adams – but quickly bowed out of this role,
knowing he would be irrelevant. He was overshadowed on Capitol Hill by his fellow
Indianans in the Senate and by Wilson, who ran his own legislative relations – poorly.
When Wilson was incapacitated by a stroke in 1919, Marshall shied away from assuming
presidential powers and took no steps to keep the executive branch running. Senate
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historian Mark Hatfield explains, “Convinced that the president and other high-ranking
officials did not take him seriously enough to listen to him, Marshall learned not to speak,
not to attend meetings, and not to offer suggestions. He became the epitome of the vice
president as nonentity.”6 Marshall’s main vice presidential legacy became his colorful
descriptions of the office:
•

“I do not blame proud parents for wishing that their sons might be President of the
United States. But if I sought a blessing for a boy I would not pray that he become
Vice-President.”7

•

“I don’t want to work [but] I wouldn’t mind being Vice President again.”

•

“Of no importance to the administration beyond the duty of being loyal to it and
ready, at any time, to act as a sort of pinch hitter; that is, when everybody else on
the team had failed, I was to be given a chance.”

•

“Once there were two brothers. One ran away to sea; the other was elected vice
president. And nothing was ever heard of either of them again.”8
The image of the vice presidency many Americans carried was of Alexander

Throttlebottom, the bumbling vice president of George Gershwin and George Kaufman’s
1931 musical Of Thee I Sing.9 Throughout the show, characters constantly forget the vice
president’s name.10 But the political zeitgeist remembered his name, and
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“Throttlebottom” became an epithet applied to incompetent politicians, and vice
presidents in particular.11
Even the more capable public servants who served as vice president in the office’s
earlier days contributed to its poor reputation. Many were aging party wisemen rewarded
with a cushy retirement position – or “promoted” to the job to elegantly remove them
from positions of power as they deteriorated mentally and physically. Others simply
suffered from the job’s irrelevance. Before FDR, vice presidents conducted little official
or informal work. Instead, Henry Wilson wrote a massive history of American slavery
while in office; Richard M. Johnson left Washington to run a tavern in Kentucky;
William R. King took his oath of office in Cuba and died on his return voyage three
weeks later.12 Before the twentieth century, the vice presidency was usually a one-term
job; even when presidents stood for reelection, parties often nominated new running
mates for the ticket.13 As the Encyclopedia Americana wrote, the early office “drew to
the Vice Presidency second-rate men.”14 Important political leaders did not wish to
sacrifice their positions for a dead-end job. Senator Daniel Webster famously declined
the vice presidential nomination with the retort “I do not propose to be buried until I am
really dead.”15
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The vice presidency’s early weakness stemmed from its unique middle ground
between the executive and legislative branches and from the era’s selection process and
criteria. As explained in Chapter II, before 1940 parties chose running mates, not
candidates – and they did so with an eye to election, not incumbency.16 The dominant
criterion was balance – relying on descriptive allegiances, rather than persuasion or
consideration of how the candidates would perform. As the selection process evolved
between 1940 and 1976, the criteria changed. Balance receded – before reshaping – as
other factors emerged. Political scientists Nelson and Milkis reflect the sentiment of
numerous scholars of the executive branch in their matter-of-fact observation that the
mid-twentieth century saw surprising “new public expectations about vice-presidential
competence.”17

Competence in the Nuclear Era
Nelson argues that Franklin Roosevelt’s death and Harry Truman’s succession
represented a key step. The specter of vice presidential succession in the nuclear age
“heightened public concern that the vice president should be a leader who was ready to
step into the presidency at a moment’s notice and serve ably and faithfully.”18 When
General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower succeeded Truman, he brought a general’s
perspective on chain-of-command to the White House. He chose a running mate he
trusted and told a press conference, “I personally believe the Vice President of the United
States should never be a nonentity. I believe he should be used. I believe he should have a
16
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very useful job.”19 Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon together devised
formal procedures for vice presidential succession in the event of presidential
incapacitation, reflecting Eisenhower’s total confidence in his second-in-command.20
As radio and television – and later the internet – transformed the American media
landscape, political culture responded. Candidates exploited the emerging forms with
innovative advertising and image-making attempts, but they also ceded power to the
media through their extensive participation. The media represent most Americans’ only
means of evaluating the presidential and vice presidential candidates, so how media
represent candidates takes on huge importance in how voters perceive them. The more
journalists and pundits call a candidate a “liberal,” or a “maverick,” or “inexperienced,”
the more voters will associate such terms with the candidate. But the media also influence
voters’ perceptions by asking questions. Constant conversation about whether or not a
candidate is “unqualified” or “too liberal” creates the same association without the
burden of proving an assertion.
As previously discussed, Carter responded to the emerging emphasis on
competence with a new selection process that elevated governance criteria over electoral
criteria. As Carter’s search progressed, pressures and expectations mounted. By the
morning of his running mate announcement, The New York Times concluded, “The public
approval Mr. Carter has achieved so far would thus be seriously diminished by a choice
seen by the country as pedestrian, or as motivated by a faith in shopworn political
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axioms.”21 But Carter and his team continued to demonstrate a remarkable understanding
of the country’s mood. As he delved into the selection process, Carter foresaw the new
alignment of governance and electoral factors. On the eve of his announcement, he
explained, “If I make the right decision in terms of the man’s ability to govern effectively
without me, then that decision will ultimately be the best politics.”22 Reflecting the new
circumstances of vice presidential nomination – the presidential candidate’s early lock on
the nomination and his authority in choosing a running mate – a New York Times article
asserted that Carter “would have little excuse for anything less.”23 The Los Angeles Times
expected the choice to “shed more light on [Carter’s] political and personal values than
any other public decision.”24 This outlook now defines the political implications of vice
presidential selection. Today, vice presidential competence represents a consideration for
voters and the media in evaluating presidential nominees’ judgment.
Since Carter’s innovations – which demonstrated and confirmed vice presidential
selection as the clear prerogative and responsibility of the presidential nominee –
attention to the vice presidential decision has grown. In 1976, The New York Times
described the choice as Carter’s “first major decision […] as the new party leader,” and
“The most important decision [he] is likely to make for a very long time to come.”25 By
1980, Democrats called it the “most important decision” of the election year as they
criticized Reagan’s haphazard selection process.26 In 1984, Mondale labeled it “the most
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important decision that a candidate for President ever makes”.27 By 1988, the Associated
Press described the notion as conventional wisdom.28 The same year, The Washington
Post editorialized that the presidential candidates should consider their running mate
selection “their first presidential decision.”29 Voters now evaluate vice presidential
candidates through this lens, and presidential nominees suffer for disregarding it.
The media’s role in shaping public perception and creating a narrative has proven
particularly important in discussions of candidate competence. Most voters will never
have the opportunity to evaluate a candidate’s expertise or preparedness directly. They
rely on media representations to do so, and media characterizations tend to take hold and
change little.30 The following studies of “incompetence” on the ticket reflect the media’s
tremendous power to shape public perception. And in presidential campaigns –
particularly in regards to competence – perception trumps reality.

Dan Quayle
Scholars and pundits consider Senator Dan Quayle as one of the worst running
mate choices in modern presidential politics. Although Vice President George H.W. Bush
won the 1988 election, his selection of the gaffe-prone young senator hurt his campaign
and his White House tenure.31 The post-election Newsweek story described Quayle’s
initial reputation as “a man of undistinction, a playboy coasting through life like a surfer
27
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on a wave.” His performance over the course of the campaign reinforced that perception
and further reduced his stature. 32
Later in-depth research and reporting on Quayle revealed a capable, affable, and
honest politician whose compounding errors sank his reputation. A prominent 1992 book
on Quayle quoted an “insider”: “It’s tough to make the argument that he is absolutely the
smartest and most qualified guy, but at the same time, this airhead stuff is really unfair.
He’s somewhere in between… and he’s a hell of a lot closer to the top than he is to the
bottom.”33 But the Quayle caricature emerged early and stuck.34
Following an extensive information-gathering process, Bush chose Quayle with
almost no input on criteria or consultation about the decision. The pick surprised many of
his closest aides, who had earlier dismissed Quayle’s chances. According to Newsweek,
Bush’s top advisor, Treasury Secretary James Baker “suggested to intimates, [that
Quayle] was a lightweight, too light to pass the stature test for so high an office, and he
told Bush so at their last meeting on the subject.”35 The announcement event went poorly
and the next few days did not go any better. As political messaging scholar Kathleen
Jamieson described, “It was Bush’s first major ‘presidential’ decision, but it looked like it
was made on an impromptu basis […] He didn’t look like he was in control. He didn’t
look presidential.”36 Criticism mounted within the Republican Party as well. As
Newsweek reported, “Bush picked his fifth son, said [former GOP presidential candidate
Representative Jack] Kemp’s chairman, Ed Rollins, when he heard the news. The more
32

Peter Goldman, “Squall in New Orleans,” Newsweek, November 21, 1988, 102.
David S. Broder and Bob Woodward, The Man Who Would Be President: Dan Quayle (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1992), 181.
34
Kurtz, “Hot off the Trail.”
35
Goldman, “Squall in New Orleans.”
36
Lloyd Grove, “Controversy Said to Hurt Convention; Specialists Say Bush Didn't Look Presidential,”
Washington Post, August 20, 1988.
33

68

common and less charitable view in New Orleans was that he had chosen his own clone –
a man who would be as loyal, as malleable, and as invisible as he had been in Reagan’s
service.”37
The Dukakis campaign and other Democrats responded to Quayle’s selection with
a two-pronged attack. They argued that Quayle’s ineptitude would make his election as
vice president problematic and perhaps dangerous. For instance, Dukakis’s running mate,
Senator Lloyd Bentsen asserted, “millions of Americans would agree that Dan Quayle is
not qualified to step in and be president. But even as vice president Dan Quayle will have
important responsibilities for which he lacks credentials.”38 Dukakis told a rally in
October, “When a nominee selects his running mate, he’s choosing the first member of
his Cabinet, the first member of the National Security Council, and the first member of
his diplomatic team.”39 Dukakis and fellow Democrats often compared, both implicitly
and explicitly, the stature of his venerated running mate with the quality of Bush’s. More
often and more prominently, however, they used Quayle’s selection as a criticism of
Bush himself. On the stump, Dukakis raised the prospect of Supreme Court vacancies
and asked, “Do you want the man who selected Dan Quayle to be making those
appointments?”40 House Democratic Whip Tony Coelho wondered, “Why did George
Bush pick Daniel Quayle? That’s got to be the question. His first presidential decision
was Dan Quayle. Michael Dukakis’ first presidential decision was Lloyd Bentsen.”
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Dukakis’s campaign manager asserted directly, “The real issue is not Dan Quayle. It’s
George Bush and his judgment.”41
Bush and Quayle’s own staff and supporters disparaged the choice as well.
Newsweek recounted that the highest praise Quayle’s campaign team could muster was
“potentially smart.” Was Quayle qualified to be president? “Of course not,” one of them
responded.42 On the record even, “The kindest words [Baker] could bring himself to say
for public consumption were that Bush had promised only to pick a qualified running
mate, not necessarily the most qualified.”43 Quayle’s lead handler, Stu Spencer, believed
that Quayle’s poor performance in the vice presidential debate cost the campaign two
points in the polls. Other campaign staffers told reporters they thought Quayle could lose
the election for Bush.44 Newsweek’s George Hackett and Howard Fineman observed that
“Bush campaigned through much of the fall as if he had no running mate at all.”45
After the vice presidential debate, the Dukakis team intensified their Quayle
offensive. The following morning, Bentsen joked at a rally, “After listening to Dan
Quayle for 90 minutes last night, I can understand why he kept talking about job
training.”46 Burnished by his independently strong performance and by the favorable
comparison, Bentsen became a more prominent part of the Dukakis pitch. Dukakis’s ads
largely omitted Bentsen before the debate; afterwards, they elevated him. One
Democratic consultant joked that the new messaging seemed to advertise a candidate
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whose “first name [was] Dukakis and his last name, Bentsen.” Newsweek recounted that
as “New spots went up attacking the choice, Bush’s margin shriveled from a landslide 10
points to a bridgeable 7.”47
In the days immediately following Quayle’s selection, a Gallup poll found that 43
percent of respondents believed Quayle qualified to serve as president if it became
necessary; 36 percent believed him unqualified.48 By October, the balance more than
flipped: 49 percent saw Quayle as unqualified for the presidency and a third saw him as
qualified.49 One month before the election, a poll indicated that 47 percent of voters
agreed “the choice of Dan Quayle as a running mate reflects unfavorably on Bush’s
ability to make important presidential decisions.”50 In The New York Times’ endorsement
editorial, the paper reflected on “Mr. Bush’s first big Presidential decision: picking Dan
Quayle. Senator Quayle is not the buffoon depicted by partisans or parodists. Yet he is
wholly unqualified to be President.” A “closely balanced scale” between “two good men”
favored Michael Dukakis.51 The Washington Post’s influential columnist David Broder
summed up the impact of Dan Quayle on the Bush candidacy:
[Bush] failed to realize the simple fact that voters now take the vice
presidency seriously. In declining to choose a candidate of the stature
Dukakis found in Sen. Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, Bush raised serious and
legitimate doubts about himself. In the end, he inadvertently proved his
opponent’s point. Competence is an issue.52
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Although Bush and Quayle won the election, Quayle was a drag on the ticket.
According to Nelson and Milkis, “Quayle may have reduced [Bush’s] margin of victory
in the popular vote by as much as four to eight percentage points;” spread across the
states, this could reasonably impact the electoral college tally.53
Margins in both the popular vote and Electoral College factor into the presidentelect’s momentum through transition, and can foster or belie claims to a mandate. Quayle
played little part publicly or privately in the transition, and Bush’s team did little early to
try to change the vice president-elect’s popular image. The outgoing Reagan-Bush team
failed to invite the Quayles to Reagan’s final state dinner with British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, indicating Quayle’s distance from the White House leadership and
from foreign policy circles.54 The Wall Street Journal ran a front-page feature on the
abundance of jokes about Quayle.55 Newsweek observed in late November, “The election
has done nothing to make Quayle less a target of ridicule,” and asked “Will the jokes ever
stop?”56 Speculation began during the transition that Quayle might be dropped from the
ticket four years later.57 One New York Times op-ed went even further, under the
headline, “Dump Quayle? It Could Still Happen.” In the piece, two lawyers explained the
rules of the Electoral College that could allow presidential electors to vote freely for
president and vice president. Given voters’ preference for Bentsen as vice president by a
two-to-one margin, they could elect him – or some qualified Republican – instead of
Quayle. They concluded, “In five weeks, the Electoral College will face the question:
53
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Should Dan Quayle be a heartbeat away from the Presidency? The answer must be no.”58
In the days after the election, one Republican consultant indicated that in the White
House, as in the campaign, “Everything Quayle does – or doesn’t do – will reflect on
George Bush’s judgment.”59
Quayle’s poor campaign performance put him in a weak position when he took
office and he continued to be marginalized throughout the Bush term.60 He remained a
constant subject of ridicule as rumors about his imminent removal from the 1992 ticket
persisted .61 In fact, the Bush team did seriously consider dumping Quayle, but
determined that it would be a sign of weakness. Quayle’s most remembered vice
presidential moment came in the summer of 1992 as he oversaw a student spelling bee in
New Jersey. When a student wrote “potato” on the chalkboard, Quayle, reading from a
flashcard, “corrected” the spelling to “potatoe.”62 The incident – caught on camera –
captured the public perception of Quayle as a nincompoop.

Sarah Palin
Two decades after Quayle’s elevation, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin faced similar
criticism. Selected by Senator John McCain to join him on the GOP ticket in 2008, she
garnered comparisons to Quayle and extensive dismissals of her qualifications for the
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post. Criticism came first from Democrats, before transcending party lines and eventually
including prominent conservative and Republican voices.
In the hours after the announcement on August 29, House Democratic Caucus
Chairman and Obama ally Rahm Emanuel issued a statement attacking Palin’s
inexperience and highlighting McCain’s age. Mentioning McCain’s 72nd birthday that
day Emanuel opined, “Is this really who the Republican Party wants to be one heartbeat
away from the Presidency? Given Sarah Palin’s lack of experience on every front and on
nearly every issue, this Vice Presidential pick doesn’t show judgment: it shows political
panic.”63 Senator John Kerry told ABC’s This Week, “I think John McCain’s judgment is
once again put at issue, because he’s chosen somebody who clearly does not meet the
national security threshold, who is not ready to be president tomorrow.”64
Republicans largely reacted positively to the pick. The Washington Post explained
that Palin helped McCain
consolidate his party’s conservative base, which has been at best
lukewarm toward his candidacy. The governor’s conservative credentials
are not in doubt, whether on abortion or gun rights or gay rights. The
announcement of her elevation to the Republican ticket brought an
outpouring of enthusiasm from the right flank of the GOP.65
One Republican operative on CNN emphasized Palin’s executive experience, faith,
energy expertise, and gender. He asserted, “It’s a perfect pick. And I think Republicans,
Democrats, and independents will be able to unite behind this ticket.”66 In the days
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following the pick, Republican voters’ enthusiasm for the ticket increased from 42
percent to 60 percent and McCain took a brief lead over Obama in national polling.67
As the Republican National Convention opened on September 1, questions about
Palin’s qualifications entered the mainstream conversation. On the eve of the convention
The Washington Post editorialized,
The most important question Mr. McCain should have asked himself
about Ms. Palin was not whether she could help him win the presidency. It
was whether she is qualified and prepared to serve as president should
anything prevent him from doing so. […] In this regard, count us among
the puzzled and the skeptical. […] Once the buzz over Ms. Palin’s
nomination dies down, the hard questions about her will begin. The
answers will reflect on her qualifications – and on Mr. McCain’s judgment
as well.68
Soon Republicans began to raise doubts about Palin’s preparedness. The next day
conservative commentator William Kristol wrote in The New York Times that if Palin
failed to demonstrate competence, McCain’s “judgment about the most important choice
he’s had to make this year will have been proved wanting. He won’t be able to plead that
being right about the surge in Iraq should be judged as more important than being right
about his vice-presidential pick.”69 Former Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan wrote in
her Wall Street Journal column,
The Sarah Palin choice is really going to work, or really not going to
work. It’s not going to be a little successful or a little not […] There are
only two questions.
1. Can she take it? […]
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2. And while she’s taking it, […] can she put herself forward convincingly
as serious enough, grounded enough, weighty enough that the American
people can imagine her as vice president of the United States?70
This narrative – Palin needs to prove herself, answer the questions about her
ability – continued into September.71 Then Palin participated in a series of challenging
interviews with network anchors. Her poor performance in the interviews sent the
McCain campaign into crisis mode immediately.72 In the following weeks, the interviews
prompted waves of attacks on her competence and qualifications. Fareed Zakaria
described her performance in Newsweek as “often, quite frankly, gibberish, […]
nonsense—a vapid emptying out of every catchphrase […] that came into her head.” He
wondered, “Can we now admit the obvious? Sarah Palin is utterly unqualified to be vice
president. […] She has never spent a day thinking about any important national or
international issue, and this is a hell of a time to start.” The column was titled “Palin Is
Ready? Please.” Zakaria concluded the column with criticism of McCain for his choice:
“In these times, for John McCain to have chosen this person to be his running mate is
fundamentally irresponsible. McCain says that he always puts country first. In this
important case, it is simply not true.”73
Others in politics and the media drew similar conclusions about McCain’s
judgment. Christopher Buckley, the son of conservative icon William F. Buckley,
endorsed Obama, citing McCain’s running mate choice and asking, “What on earth can
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he have been thinking?”74 Reagan’s former White House Chief of Staff, Kenneth
Duberstein told MSNBC that the Palin pick “has very much undermined the whole
question of John McCain’s judgment.”75 The New York Times editorialized “If he
seriously thought this first-term governor – with less than two years in office – was
qualified to be president, if necessary, at such a dangerous time, it raises profound
questions about his judgment.”76
Palin’s apparent incompetence contributed to an emerging picture of John
McCain as erratic, desperate, and focused on winning first. Obama campaign focus
groups suggested that voters began to see McCain as “unsteady, impulsive, and
reckless.”77 In the final days before the election, a New York Times/CBS News poll
found that 59 percent of voters believed Palin unprepared to serve as vice president; 32
percent said that the vice-presidential selection would have “a great deal of influence” on
their vote for president.78 And according to the Times, “voters said they had much more
confidence in Mr. Obama to pick qualified people for his administration than they did in
Mr. McCain.”79 Although exit polls offered mixed information about Palin’s role in the
election’s outcome, subsequent research by political scientists suggests that she had “an
extraordinarily large, and negative, impact” on McCain’s performance.80
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Conclusion
During Jimmy Carter’s running mate search in 1976, The New York Times
editorialized that the traditional selection process and criteria were “tactically a failure
[and] morally worse.”81 Because voters came to value competence in vice presidential
candidates, presidential nominees now face both an ethical obligation and a political
imperative to choose an able running mate. George H.W. Bush survived the Quayle
drama, but the Palin debacle may put to rest the political gamble of ignoring competence
as a key criterion for selection.
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CHAPTER IV
Conclusion
In 2008, political scientists George Edwards and Lawrence Jacobs observed that
recent decades saw “the transformation of the vice presidency into a pivotal new force in
the Executive Office of the President and the executive branch more generally [and] a
critical institutional base of power and decision making.”1 As the vice presidency grew in
stature, the selection process changed to accommodate the office’s new relevance. Since
1976, the influence of the vice presidency and the seriousness of the selection process
ratcheted up in a reinforcing cycle: the more important vice presidents became, the more
extensive and reliable the selection process became, and as the selection process
improved, it yielded better vice presidents. The changes in the vice presidential selection
process and criteria represent an unusual story in American politics: voters and the media
forced presidential candidates to move beyond strategic political concerns and do better
for the country.
The Eagleton affair and the Agnew-Nixon-Ford turmoil between the 1972 and
1976 presidential elections created a vice presidential crisis moment in the political
culture. The conventional wisdom held that running mates were chosen for exclusively
electoral – not governance – considerations, making it a problematic, even dangerous
office ripe for potential abuse and constitutional crisis. Reform proposals from scholars,
lawmakers, political operatives, former vice presidents and vice presidential candidates,
1
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and the Democratic Party sought to avoid these problems by forcing new selection
procedures or limiting the pool of eligible candidates. But the proposals went nowhere –
initially because of political inertia in the face of a daunting constitutional challenge, and
then because the naturally evolving selection process and criteria rendered them
irrelevant.
After 1960, conventions merely endorsed the presumptive presidential nominees’
vice presidential picks. After 1976, when conventions were no longer meaningful in the
selection of presidential nominees, running mate choice became solely the prerogative of
presidential nominees – and nominees had increasing amounts of time for the selection
process. Candidates no longer needed to “balance the ticket” to secure the nomination at
the convention, freeing them to elevate other criteria – like competence, compatibility,
and loyalty.
Candidates now need to demonstrate presidential judgment in their running mate
selection; they need to vouch for their running mates’ ability and preparedness to serve as
president should the need arise. And they must build a ticket with enough policy and
political consistency to convey a clear message about their vision for the country and to
ensure continuity should the vice president ascend to the Oval Office. As Carter sought to
proscribe the mistakes of previous running mates, he devised a thorough selection
process that yielded, as Edwards and Jacobs summarize the scholarly and popular
consensus, “the most important vice president in history to that point.”2
The success of the Carter model gave subsequent nominees no excuse for taking
the decision lightly. Given nominees’ now clear agency in the selection process, voters
2
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and the media hold them accountable for their choices. There is now a political
imperative to make the decision with an eye toward governance over electoral criteria.
Without a constitutional amendment, new laws, or changes in party rules, the American
political system resolved the vice presidential crisis.
By 2012, nine elements emerged as the effective standard in the vice presidential
selection process:
•

An extended consideration period of two to three months;

•

A vetting team working exclusively on the selection;

•

A small circle of participants in the process;

•

Lawyer- and accountant-driven vetting of a broad range of personal
information;

•

Opinion polling on potential candidates;

•

Interviews of the candidates by the senior campaign officials and the
presumptive nominee;

•

Official secrecy about the process and its subjects;

•

A calculated leak of the short list; and

•

A specially staged announcement event.

Although some improvisations on these themes have succeeded, evidence suggests that
skipping or skimping on these elements is risky. (The exception is secrecy, which creates
the potential political benefit of surprise – but this piece has not been tested, as in the last
five elections no candidate has done anything different.) Some presidential nominees
added additional steps that have not proven problematic. And as Carter did in 1976,
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subsequent candidates should implement additional steps they deem necessary to address
emerging problems.
Two criteria carry universal and lasting import in vice presidential selection:
competence and ticket bolstering. The vice president has only two constitutional
obligations: breaking ties in the Senate and succeeding to the presidency if necessary.
Finding a candidate prepared to perform the first task is easy; finding one prepared for
the second is not. But, today’s politics demand vice presidents who are ready to be
commander-in-chief on day one. Competence must be the first standard for candidates to
meet before any other criteria are considered.
Nearly two centuries of political history suggest ticket “balance” as the crucial
criterion in choosing a running mate. While some scholars and pundits continue to
advance balance as the watchword of the “Veepstakes” the utility of balance largely
expired as the selection process – and the electorate’s expectations – changed. And
descriptive “balance” on a ticket has proven meaningless in appealing to demographic
groups like religious or ethnic minorities and women. Instead, presidential nominees
should focus on selecting running mates of unassailable competence who bolster the
ticket . Some narrow forms of traditional balance remain relevant; balance in region,
insider-outsider status, immediate government experience, and age have persisted on
many recent winning tickets. These should be secondary considerations to competence
and bolstering the ticket.
By the time a nominee announces his running mate, he has built a political brand
that drives his campaign’s narrative and creates the imperative for his election. His
running mate should not undermine that structure by contradicting the candidate’s
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political characteristics, which include policy positions, campaign themes, family history,
alliances, loyalties, promises, goals, ideology, identity, and record. But total redundancy
limits the ticket’s appeal and preparation for the White House. So a running mate should
bring something new – experience at a different level of government, association with
particular policy issues, personal style. Whatever the running mate brings to the ticket
should connect clearly and simply to the existing structure. A vice presidential nominee
should extend the presidential nominee’s narrative, carry his message, and reinforce the
imperative driving the campaign.
Several other myths about vice presidential selection persist. For instance, pundits
continue to highlight the potential benefit of choosing a running mate from a crucial
swing state. But presidential nominees rarely choose running mates based on this
criterion, and there is no evidence that running mates have carried their home states in
recent decades.3 Observers caution against choosing a running mate who might
“outshine” or “upstage” the top of the ticket. There is no evidence that this has ever been
a problem itself in previous campaigns. Although Sarah Palin consumed much of the
attention during the final weeks of the 2008 campaign, the damage she wrought on John
McCain’s chances came from implications about his judgment, not her rock-star status.
The weakness of these “rules” and the continued discussion of “balance” despite
its trend toward irrelevance indicate the inadequacy of the “Veepstakes” conventional
wisdom. Furthermore, a competent running mate who bolsters the ticket will not always
make a good vice president as well. So presidential nominees must decide what kind of
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president-vice president relationship they envision, and what kind of compatibility that
vision requires. They need to address the political context of the moment and the
circumstances they would face if elected. A running mate is a statement about the
presidential nominee’s identity and a measure of his judgment. Whomever a presidential
nominee picks, he must be prepared to defend his running mate as both his preferred
White House partner and his preferred successor.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baumgartner, Jody C. The American Vice Presidency Reconsidered. Westport, CT.:
Praeger, 2006.
Cronin, Thomas E., and Michael A. Genovese. The Paradoxes of the American
Presidency. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2010.
Edwards III, George C., and Lawrence R. Jacobs. “The New Vice Presidency:
Institutions and Politics.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September
2008): 369-73.
Goldstein, Joel K. The Modern American Vice Presidency: The Transformation of a
Political Institution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ Pr, 1982.
Hatfield, Mark O. Vice Presidents of the U.S. 1789-1993. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1997.
Heilemann, John, and Mark Halperin. Game Change: Obama and the Clintons, McCain
and Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime. New York: Harper, 2010.
Hiller, Mark, and Douglas Kriner. “Institutional Change and the Dynamics of Vice
Presidential Selection.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September
2008): 401-21.
Institute of Politics. Report of the Study Group On Vice-Presidential Selection.
Cambridge: John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
1976.
Kengor, Paul. Wreath Layer or Policy Player: The Vice President’s Role in Foreign
Policy. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2000.
Light, Paul C. Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.
Maltese, John Anthony, and Joseph A. Pika. The Politics of the Presidency. 7th ed.
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009.
Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. The American Presidency: Origins and
Development, 1776-2007. 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008.
Mondale, Walter F., with David Hage. The Good Fight: A Life in Liberal Politics. 1st

85

Scribner hardcover ed. New York: Scribner, 2010.
National Party Conventions: 1831-2000. Washington: CQ Press, 2000.
Nelson, Michael. “Choosing the Vice President.” PS: Political Science and Politics 21,
no. 4 (Autumn, 1988): 858-68.
Plouffe, David. The Audacity to Win: The Inside Story and Lessons of Barack Obama's
Historic Victory. New York: Viking Adult, 2009.
Purcell, L. Edward, ed. Vice Presidents: A Biographical Dictionary. 4th ed. New York:
Facts on File, 2010.
Safire, William. Safire’s Political Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press USA,
2008.
Sigelman, Lee. “The ‘Veepstakes’: Strategic Choice in Presidential Running Mate
Selection.” The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (Dec., 1997): 855
64.

86

APPENDIX A
Jake A. Petzold
Professor Adam Wolfson
Government 127
Friday, May 7, 2010

THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: A BFD

I.

INTRODUCTION
Since the foundation of the American Republic in 1789, nine presidents have left

office before the expiration of their terms – four died of natural causes, four were
assassinated, one resigned. And 14 of our 44 presidents have been vice presidents,
including seven of the last nineteen.1
Even if they never ascend to the presidency, modern vice presidents matter. They
matter because they wield influence with the president and other lawmakers. They matter
because their selection tells us something about the president who chose them. And they
matter because as one of two nationally elected offices in the United States, they tell us
something about us.
Yet the institution of the vice presidency remains misunderstood and largely
unrecognized. At the turn of the last century, the vice presidency looked the same as it
had 96 years prior. But in part due to the public’s indifference, in the next 96 years, it
would transform drastically and rapidly. This paper will examine that growth.
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I will start with a survey of the office’s foundations, including its constitutional
origins and changes and its pre-20th Century practice. The next section – the bulk of the
paper – will chart the changes to the office over the course of the 20th Century.
One of the few scholars of the vice presidency, Jody Baumgartner, recognizes a
“transitional era” of the vice presidency, lasting from the start of Theodore Roosevelt’s
term in 1901 through the end of Richard Nixon’s in 1961; he considers Lyndon Johnson
the first vice president of the “modern era.”2 Paul Light, the inventor of vice presidential
scholarship, calls Nelson Rockefeller the first “modern” vice president.3 But most
scholars and historians give that designation to Walter Mondale.4
Scholars and political observers quickly came to describe the “Mondale model” as
the first defined change from the 19th Century vice presidency. Twenty years later they
spoke about a new, discrete “Gore model” and after that the “Cheney model.” And then
they wondered for which model Joe Biden would opt.5
But my paper finds that there are no permanent models of the vice presidency. In
the story of the modern vice presidency, each model only lasts until it is replaced by a
new, expanded version. In fact, one could argue that there have been 47 discrete models
of the vice presidency – the same number as there have been vice presidents. But while
every vice presidency brings some new element – some “first” – one change, or even a
handful of small changes do not a new model make.
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Some vice presidencies brought revolutionary institutional changes to bear at
crucial moments and in partnership with forward-thinking presidents. These
administrations left their successors new models of the vice presidency – for a time. The
contributions of each one of these watershed vice presidents constitute important building
blocks in the institution Americans would recognize today. Without the innovations of
Vice Presidents Henry Wallace, Richard Nixon, Walter Mondale, Al Gore, and Dick
Cheney, the office would not have the relevance and influence it has today.

II.

FOUNDATIONS
a. The Constitutional Vice Presidency
In their chapter “The American Vice Presidency” in the book The Paradoxes of

the American Presidency, Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese repeat the claim
that the vice presidency was “an afterthought” at the Constitutional Convention. 6 They
call it a “conspicuous constitutional mistake.”7 Although it was only briefly considered
by the Convention – and toward the end of their agenda – the vice presidency was a
deliberate response to pressing challenges in the emerging document. The office
ultimately created bridged major constitutional gaps the delegates had been facing in the
areas of presidential election, presidential vacancy, and Senate leadership.8
As the Convention designed the Electoral College, the delegates worried that
electors would vote exclusively for candidates from their own states, making a majority
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effectively impossible to achieve. They responded to this concern by giving electors two
votes for president and requiring that they vote for at least one candidate from a different
state. To discourage electors from wasting their second vote, the Convention gave both
votes meaning by making the presidential runner-up the vice president.9
The vice presidency also solved another confounding debate about presidential
selection: succession in the case of a vacancy. Early concepts considered included
simply directing the Congress to establish a statutory order of succession and making the
Chief Justice of the United States the designated successor. But with the addition of the
vice presidency the Convention had already created a sensible solution. Because the vice
president would be chosen by the same process and at the same time as the president, his
succession would uphold democratic ideals while also assuring a competent and stable
regime.10
As the Framers sought to provide the second office with at least some official
duty, they injected the vice president into the debate over Senate leadership. The
Senate’s necessarily even number of members meant that tie votes would occasionally
arise – this held especially true given the Senate’s original design. The body was
intended to be a sort of “council of state [or] prime presidential counseling body,”
originally “comprised [of] a small number of elder statesmen.” With 26 members plus
the vice president, ties were likely.11 Should the chamber’s permanent presiding officer
be a sitting senator, giving him the tie-breaking vote would be inequitable in one of two
ways. Either that senator would only be allowed to vote in the event of a tie – in which
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case his state would have less representation in the senate than all the others– or that
senator would vote on the controversial measure twice – giving his state in effect more
representation. The appointment of a stand-alone officer to adjudicate tie votes removed
the question of equal representation from the issue.12
The ratified Constitution described a limited vice presidency:
•

“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but
shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”13

•

“[The President] shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and,
together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as
follows.”

•

“After the Choice of President, the Person having the greatest Number of
Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain
two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by
Ballot the Vice President.”

•

“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President.”14

In plugging other structural holes with the vice presidency, the Framers created a
new office that was a pastiche of paradoxes, and what one scholar describes as “an
anomalous amalgam within the American constitutional order.”15 Over the two centuries
since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, four of the seventeen amendments to the U.S.
12
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Constitution have shaped the vice presidency.16 Theses changes addressed alreadytranspired and foreseen crises.
When the presidential election of 1800 resulted in an electoral tie, the selection of
the president fell to the House of Representatives, despite the clear intention of the
Electoral College to choose Thomas Jefferson. Concerns of home-state hegemony
among the electors sufficiently allayed, Congress moved relatively quickly to revamp the
election process. The 12th Amendment provides for the election of the president and vice
president on separate ballots.17
In the 1930s, Americans confronted the tradition of crises breaking out during the
four months between a presidential election and the victor’s inauguration. The 20th
Amendment changed that by moving the presidential and vice presidential inaugurations
from March 4th to January 20th.18
In response to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s unprecedented election to four terms as
president, democratic-minded lawmakers sought to proscribe the recurrence of such a
case. The 22nd Amendment limits the number of terms a president can serve to two – the
precedent established by George Washington at the Republic’s beginning. This change
increased the likelihood of vice presidents pursuing and attaining the presidency.19
With the Constitution silent on the question of vice presidential succession, for
the first 185 years of the Republic, when vice presidents left office, no one replaced them.
By 1965, the vice presidency had been vacant for a combined 36 years.20 The
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assassination of President John F. Kennedy and elevation of Vice President Lyndon
Johnson to the Oval Office in 1963 reminded the country of the importance of clear plans
of succession. Less than four years after Kennedy’s assassination, the 25th Amendment
devised a process for filling vice presidential vacancies: nomination by the president and
confirmation by a majority of both houses of Congress. The Amendment also created a
succession system to address temporary presidential incapacity and clarified that in the
case of a presidential vacancy, the vice president assumes the presidency and not just its
powers.21

b. The Historical Vice Presidency
The vice presidency of the 19th Century held nearly no potential for advancement
or lasting relevance. Without influence or esteem, the vice presidential nomination
usually served as a retirement gift for aging party wise men or an entirely symbolic show
for unhappy corners of the party. Of the first 24 vice presidents, six died in office; one,
John C. Calhoun, had terrible relationships with both the presidents he served and joined
the Confederate Army.22
Throughout the 19th and into the 20th Century the vice presidency was an almost
exclusively legislative position in perception and practice.23 The first vice president,
John Adams, performed only one executive act during his eight years in office – he also
cast the most tie-breaking Senate votes of any vice president in history: 29.24
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Overwhelmingly, Adams’s 19th Century successors shared his experience – but with even
less legislative activity. So they passed their time in office doing other things: Henry
Wilson wrote three books on the slave trade in America; Hannibal Hamilin never left his
home in Maine; Richard Johnson ran a tavern; and Aaron Burr killed Alexander
Hamilton.25
For more than half of this country’s history, such was the nature of its secondhighest office.

III.

THE MODERN VICE PRESIDENCY
a. Pre-Wallace
The start of the evolution of the vice presidency roughly coincided with the turn

of the last century. Some minor changes introduced by early 20th Century vice presidents
contributed to the slow growth of the office. These terms included a handful of notable
“firsts.”
Baumgartner identifies Theodore Roosevelt – elected in 1900 as William
McKinley’s second vice president – as a different sort of vice president from his
predecessors and classifies him as the first vice president of the “transitional era.”26
Roosevelt served as vice president for only six months before succeeding to the
presidency following McKinley’s assassination. Although the first vice presidential
nominee to campaign around the country, Roosevelt made no substantive changes to the
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office.27 Yet he brought a new tone to the position. Diana Dixon Healy described
Roosevelt’s role thus:
There have been other ambitious vice-presidents: Burr, Calhoun, Nixon. And
intelligent vice-presidents: Jefferson, Wallace. And charismatic vice-presidents:
Stevenson, Breckinridge. There have been patriotic vice-presidents: John Adams,
Andrew Johnson. And verbose vice-presidents: Humphrey, Dawes. There have
been others who were lucky, who had large families, and who had wealthy,
privileged backgrounds. But there had never been a vice-president who embodied
all these qualities until Theodore Roosevelt.28
In the evolution of the modern vice presidency, Roosevelt represents the homo erectus:
evolved from his Australopithecus forebears, but still steps away from his homo sapiens
progeny.
Thomas Marshall left his two terms as vice president after a handful of important
contributions to the office. He was the first vice president since Adams to attend a
Cabinet meeting – which he did only occasionally – and chaired a series of them while
President Woodrow Wilson was in Paris negotiating an end to World War I.29 Marshall’s
prominent public campaigns for Democratic congressional candidates and in support of
Liberty Loans marked a new addition to the vice president’s portfolio. His appearance on
the USS Colorado in 1915 also saw the first version of an unofficial vice presidential
flag.30 But the part of Marshall’s vice presidential legacy most commented on today are
his colorful descriptions of the office:
•

“A man in a cataleptic fit; he cannot speak; he cannot move; he suffers no
pain; he is perfectly conscious of all that goes on, but has no part in it.”31
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•

“Once there were two brothers. One ran away to sea, the other was elected
Vice President of the United States, and nothing was heard of either of them
again.”32

•

“A monkey cage, except that the visitors do not offer me any peanuts.”33

President Warren Harding invited Vice President Calvin Coolidge to attend
Cabinet meetings, which Coolidge regularly did, but Coolidge’s vice president, Charles
Dawes, declined the invitation. Vice President Charles Curtis occasionally joined
President Herbert Hoover’s Cabinet sessions. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term,
however, regular vice presidential participation in Cabinet meetings has been a continued
practiced.34
Cabinet participation is among the reasons some consider Roosevelt’s first vice
president, John Nance Garner, the first modern vice president. Garner was the first vice
president to travel abroad on his boss’s behalf and the first to become an important link
between the White House and Capitol Hill. 35 And, symbolically, the first to serve with
an official vice presidential flag.36 Yet Garner and Roosevelt had a particularly messy
and treacherous relationship. By1940, Garner actually challenged his boss for their
party’s presidential nomination, ensuring his absence from the Democratic ticket that
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fall.37 Garner also contributed some of the most famous descriptions of the vice
presidency:
•

“A spare tire on the automobile of government.”38

•

“Not worth a bucket of warm piss.”39

b. Henry A. Wallace
As Secretary of Agriculture – like his father before him – Henry A. Wallace
served as an important counselor to President Roosevelt through the Administration’s
first two terms. Indeed, he was considered by contemporary accounts “deputy leader of
the New Deal.”40 After Roosevelt’s public split with Garner at the height of his power,
Roosevelt sought a trustworthy and reliable confidante to join him in his effort for a third
term. Threatening to decline his party’s nomination without his choice of running mate,
Roosevelt demanded that the Democratic convention nominate Wallace for vice
president. Unsurprisingly, the convention complied, making Henry Wallace the first
running mate chosen by the presidential nominee of his party.41
Through the early part of Roosevelt’s third term, scholars and politicians believed
Wallace’s selection to constitute a conscious torch-passing on the part of the president.
Samuel E. Wood of the University of California wrote that “as the heir apparent of New
Deal leadership,” Wallace “will become, in fact, the ‘assistant president’ of the United
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States.”42 In the fall of 1940, Representative August Andresen of Minnesota, a
Democrat, even made the claim in a speech to the House that “if the Democratic national
ticket should happen to be successful this fall, there is little doubt that Mr. Roosevelt
plans to turn the Presidency over to his running mate, Henry A. Wallace, within the next
year or two.” Roosevelt’s verbal slip in his acceptance speech – “To you, the delegates to
this convention, I express my gratitude for the selection of Henry Wallace for the high
office of President of the United States” – further encouraged such speculation.43
Following the election, Roosevelt appointed Wallace chair of the Economic
Defense Board, the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, the War Productions Board,
and the Board of Economic Welfare; according to Cronin and Genovese, these roles
made Wallace “the first vice president to be assigned major administrative duties.”44 The
assumption of these roles as the U.S. prepared for and entered World War II made
Wallace a prominent and powerful part of the domestic policy team and an important
contributor to Roosevelt’s secret “war Cabinet.”45
Wallace continued the Administration’s lobbying on the Hill, but brought an
imprimatur to the efforts that his predecessor lacked. Given the close alliance between
Wallace and Roosevelt, legislators knew that Wallace spoke on the president’s behalf in a
way Garner never could.46
Even before his swearing-in as vice president, Wallace began aiding Roosevelt as
an ambassador beyond the command of the Foreign Service or the State Department. In
42
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1940, Wallace attended the Mexican presidential inauguration and delivered a wellreceived speech in Spanish. Three years later, he returned to Latin America on a tour of
Costa Rica, Panama, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. In 1944, Roosevelt
sent Wallace on a high-profile trip to China and the Soviet Union.47
During Wallace’s 1944 trip abroad, conservative elements of the Democratic
Party began machinating for Wallace’s removal from the ticket. By the time Wallace
retuned to the U.S., Roosevelt had effectively resigned himself to Wallace’s eventual
departure. At the convention in Chicago, party leaders and delegates nominated Senator
Harry S. Truman for the vice presidency. Roosevelt won an unprecedented fourth term
and Truman became the 34th vice president on January 20th, 1945. Roosevelt died 82
days later.48

c. The Wallace Model
The two vice presidents following Wallace – Truman and Alben W. Barkley –
inherited and maintained the prerogatives of the office Wallace had forged. Truman’s
brief vice presidency left little imprint on the office, but influenced his decisions to
enhance the position during Barkley’s tenure.
The oft-repeated detail of Truman’s quick succession to the presidency following
Roosevelt’s death is that only after becoming president did he discover the existence of
the Manhattan Project and the U.S.’s emerging nuclear capability. While one could
attribute this fact to Truman’s brief time serving under Roosevelt, it at least serves as an
47
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example of the estrangement between the two leaders. In fact, between their nomination
in August 1944 and Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, the pair met only eight times.49
The unpreparedness Truman experienced upon his succession to the Oval Office
led him to reconsider the role of the vice presidency. During his time as president,
Truman made a handful of changes to the second office and took steps to accommodate
Vice President Barkley. Barkley, who had been the Democrats’ Senate Minority Leader,
was a “visible and popular” vice president.50 Truman attempted to keep Wallace wellapprised of important information and events and issued an executive order providing for
a new vice presidential flag and, for the first time, a vice presidential seal and coat of
arms. Most concretely, Truman urged the Congress to include the vice president as a
statutory member of the National Security Council upon the NSC’s official establishment
in 1947.51

d. Richard M. Nixon
Richard M. Nixon entered the vice presidency with the advantages of the Wallace
innovations, the recent changes under Truman, and an aging president – Dwight D.
Eisenhower – who valued clear chains-of-command. During his vice presidency, Nixon
recorded few historical “firsts,” but took his inherited prerogatives to an unprecedented
scale.
According to Paul Kengor, Eisenhower chose Richard Nixon for three primary
reasons. First, Eisenhower believed Nixon shared his political philosophy. Second,
49
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Eisenhower worried that his advanced age could be a political weakness, so he decided to
“take the opportunity to select a vice-presidential candidate who was young, vigorous,
ready to learn, and of good reputation.” And third, Eisenhower saw “communist
infiltration and common methods for defeating it in our country” as important issues for
the next president; Nixon’s investigation of Alger Hiss had made him a well-known
“communist-hunter.”52
Eisenhower brought to the White House many of the practices and approaches
that served him well during his distinguished military leadership. Among these were the
notion of an inclusive, active, and efficient command structure and comprehensive
contingency planning. These meant a conviction that his constitutional second-incommand should serve meaningful purposes both in advancing the Administration’s
agenda and in preparing to govern in the case of disaster.53 He explained during the
campaign: “I personally believe the Vice President of the United States should never be a
nonentity. I believe he should be used. I believe he should have a very useful job.”
Before entering the White House, Eisenhower promised Nixon participation “in all
policy-making meetings” and “assignments to prepare him for the possibility that he
might suddenly become president.”54
The National Security Council having been formally established in 1947, Nixon
attended 217 NSC meetings, presiding over 26; he attended 163 Cabinet meetings,
chairing 19; and was included in the paper flow of both groups.55 Nixon also “set the
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standard for midterm campaigning with his efforts in 1954 and 1958” and “took seven
foreign trips to 54 countries,” conducting “extended discussions with nine prime
ministers, 35 presidents, five kings, two emperors, and the Shah of Iran.”56
Nixon’s line jobs on the domestic policy side included chairing the Cabinet
Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth and the President’s Committee on
Government Contracts.57
Nixon dispensed with most of the office’s legislative functions – his primary
original change to the vice presidency. While Vice President Barkley had presided over
50-75% of the Senate’s sessions during his vice presidency, Nixon rarely took the chair
in the Senate chamber.58 He estimated that he spent 90% of his time on executive
functions and 10% on legislative duties.59
In 1958, Eisenhower and Nixon exchanged a series of letters detailing
circumstances under which Nixon should become acting president and when he should
return those powers to Eisenhower. These exchanges foreshadowed the questions later
addressed by the 25th Amendment.60
During the 1960 presidential campaign, when asked about a major idea Nixon had
contributed to the administration, Eisenhower famously responded, “If you give me a
week, I might think of one. I don’t remember.” This single comment was repeated often
during the campaign and has made its way into history. But Eisenhower was actually
quite pleased with his vice president’s performance. According to Kengor, “The way he
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treated Nixon in both private and public, and the significant duties he assigned him,
belies the view that Ike was unimpressed or displeased with his loyal vice president.”
The two saw each other at least “three times a week while Congress was in session.” In
fact, Ralph DeToledano wrote that Eisenhower once claimed, “Dick is the most valuable
member of my team.”61

e. The Nixon Model
After the Eisenhower Administration, the vice presidency entered a period of
upheaval. Following Nixon, six vice presidents and 20 years intervened before another
vice president served two full terms; in fact, of those six, only three even completed one
whole term. For the five vice presidents who succeeded Nixon, the privileges and powers
of the vice presidency remained mostly unchanged.
Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the vice presidency expecting to expand and
revolutionize the office in the same way he expanded and revolutionized every job he’d
ever held. But concerns within President John F. Kennedy’s inner circle led them to
proscribe the potential growth of the vice presidency by sidelining Johnson from
legislative liaison and helping to stymie his early power grab attempts. As the outgoing
Majority Leader – a post which had made him the most powerful Democrat in
Washington, and probably the country – Johnson planned to keep his ornate and central
Capitol office (the “Taj Mahal”) and continue presiding over Senate Democratic Caucus
meetings. When these plans met unexpected opposition on the Hill, Johnson abandoned
them, to the White House’s relief. Johnson’s colossal reputation and skill set within
61
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Congress made Kennedy uneasy with the vice president as the lead legislative negotiator.
Kennedy and his advisers believed Johnson so adept that if empowered, he could use his
dual-branch foothold to take effective control of the legislative agenda.62
As a consolation prize of sorts, Kennedy sent Johnson on a series of high-profile
international trips.63 But his influence was negligible. He later recalled “trips around the
world, chauffeurs, men saluting, people clapping, [and] chairmanships of councils, but in
the end, it is nothing. I detested every minute of it.”64
The Johnson-Kennedy relationship suffered from a dynamic on which many
observers – including Harry Truman – have commented: a rivalry within the White
House arising from the president and vice president’s relative political equality when
elected. In this particular case, Kennedy served as a senator under Johnson as Majority
Leader – making him in effect a subordinate of his own running mate. Truman noted that
both the president and vice president are likely to be capable politicians with their own
interests and agendas, creating a mutual hesitance to trust the other.65
The Johnson vice presidency did bring about one important “first” that enhanced
the office’s power: an office suite in the executive complex. Even though Kennedy
reportedly made this change “to keep [Johnson] under tighter watch,” according to Paul
Light, it served to extend “the vice president’s proximity and visibility with the White
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House.”66 Every vice president since Johnson has used his Old Executive Office
Building suite as his primary office, while still maintaining a Capitol Hill outpost.67
As president, Johnson shared a familar dynamic with his second-in-command,
Hubert H. Humphrey. Humphrey took the post knowing well Johnson’s famous demands
for and understanding of loyalty: “I want him to kiss my ass in Macy’s window at high
noon and tell me it smells like roses. I want his pecker in my pocket.”68 Humphrey
pledged this kind of loyalty. Despite Humphrey’s personal reservations about escalating
the Vietnam conflict, when Johnson decided to do so, the vice president became the
Administration’s main defender of war policy. This position hampered – maybe even
destroyed – Humphrey’s chances of winning the 1960 presidential election.69
Nixon’s vice president, Spiro T. Agnew, left little mark on the office. His greatest
personal contribution appears to be his decision to resign once under indictment to spare
the noble office a felony bribery conviction. Agnew was the second vice president to
resign; John C. Calhoun left the office in 1832 to become a U.S. Senator from South
Carolina.70 As vice president, Agnew served as the Nixon Administration’s leading
attack dog, and gave political rhetoric an injection of angry alliteration, earning fame for
phrases like “nattering nabobs of negativism,” “pusillanimous pussyfooters,” “vicars of
vacillation,” and “hopeless, hysterical hypochondriacs of history.”71
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During Agnew’s tenure, the vice president’s executive office made its first formal
appearance in the United States Government Organization Manual 1972/73. While
mostly a symbolic shift indicating decades worth of evolution, according to Light, “the
listing helped define the boundaries of an executive agency.”72 This step followed the
1969 victory of achieving a line item within the president’s budget.73 Agnew was also
the first vice president allowed permanent access to government aircraft – a nondescript,
windowless Air Force plane that Agnew staff called “Air Force Thirteen.”74
On December 6, 1973, Gerald R. Ford became the first vice president to take
office through the process prescribed by the 25th Amendment.75 Yet Ford’s time as vice
president would be remarkably brief. Ford became the 38th President of the United States
following Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974. The Fords weren’t even the Second
Family long enough to move into the vice president’s official residence.76 But during his
tour in the second office, Ford won an important vice presidential prerogative: staff
authority. After his swearing-in, Ford decided against accepting White House staff
assistance and instead hired his own counsel, national security advisor, speechwriters,
and administrative aides; over the course of his vice presidency, his staff grew from 17 to
70. His practices inaugurated “the vice president’s freedom to hire and fire the staffs of
his choice” and constituted “the first self-contained vice president’s office.”77
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The institutionalization begun during the Ford vice presidency continued during
the tenure of Ford’s vice president, Nelson A. Rockefeller. Succeeding to the office
almost exactly one year after his boss had, Rockefeller became the second – and thus far
the last – vice president appointed under the 25th Amendment.78 During the Rockefeller
vice presidency, the organization of the vice president’s office continued to expand and
formalize. By the time Ford and Rockefeller left the White House, the vice president’s
office “was a mirror of the president’s office” and had “specific chains of commands and
functions.” These steps succeeded in defining “the institutional identity of the vice
president’s office.”79

f. Walter F. Mondale
The vice presidency Walter F. Mondale inherited had been burnished by the Ford
and Rockefeller innovations, and Mondale was eager to parlay those structural changes
into a new level of vice presidential influence.
Mondale entered the post with a clear-eyed understanding of – and essentially
resignation to – the job’s limits and frustrations. But in President Jimmy Carter, he found
a partner open to the project of reshaping and enlarging the scope of the vice presidency.
Mondale’s unique vice presidency began as a unique vice presidential nominee.
In selecting Mondale, Carter introduced the thorough, deliberate vetting system virtually
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universal in today’s “veepstakes.”80 And in October of 1976, Mondale participated in the
first vice presidential debate with Senator Bob Dole.81
Carter used three criteria in selecting Mondale as his running mate: ability to
serve as president if necessary, political and personal compatibility, and regional balance.
Furthermore, Carter knew that he needed a governing partner with solid Washington
experience. The partnership Mondale and Carter forged changed the nature of the vice
presidency. In their earliest meetings, Mondale impressed Carter with “a list of the ways
in which he could help Carter politically as his running mate,” but more importantly, with
an unambiguous and cogent vision of the White House figure he sought to be: “an activist
vice president, enjoying a level of access that few, in any, previous occupants had
attained.”82
Following the election, Carter offered Mondale the chief of staff position – which
Mondale declined because he knew “it would have consumed him” – and encouraged
Mondale to take the lead in Congressional relations – a task from which Mondale also
shied. Instead, Mondale envisioned himself as “a general adviser to the president” – a
concept Carter eagerly supported. To their first transition planning meeting, Mondale
brought “a detailed memorandum outlining the role he wanted to play in the new
administration.” Carter agreed heartily with all of Mondale’s recommendations and
added more. The ideas laid out in that meeting were executed after the inauguration.83
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The original innovations Mondale and Carter instituted are prerogatives
contemporary vice presidents take for granted – in fact, they read like a description of Al
Gore or Joe Biden’s typical week as vice president. These changes included participation
in all Cabinet meetings, NSC briefings, and Economic Policy Group discussions;
inclusion in all of the president’s paper flow, including his full daily schedule; a standing
invitation to all political meetings; a weekly private lunch; direct placement of staff
within the national security and domestic policy operations; a permanent Capitol Hill
staff; and – perhaps most importantly – a West Wing office.84
Mondale White House speechwriter Marty Kaplan emphasizes certain elements of
these changes as particularly important. Not only was Mondale granted a West Wing
office, but “also contiguous space for his executive assistant (this was really important),
plus their secretaries.” And in addition to Mondale’s being allowed to appoint emissaries
to the main White House policy staffs, “a bunch of Mondale people – who’d been on his
Senate staff, or advised him – went into key positions on Carter's staff,” including Bert
Carp running the Domestic Policy Council and David Aaron as Deputy NSC Director.85
Kaplan also pointed out “one important thing [Mondale] made sure he didn’t
have: line authority over anything (policy processes, task forces, commissions, initiatives,
etc.)” Mondale was concerned that such assignments would weaken his big-picture
influence and he “didn’t want to get pulled into that kind of quicksand.”86 Furthermore,
Mondale believed his value as a general adviser relied upon his independence from the
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“institutional baggage or bias” which could easily come with specific policy
responsibilities.87
Of real importance in political perception, the perks of the vice presidency rapidly
grew under Mondale. These new official benefits included “White House mess
privileges, better aircraft, better offices, fast printing support, and limousines.” Most
evidently, the Mondales were the first Second Family to live at Number One Observatory
Circle, the official residence of the Vice President of the United States. These status
symbols sent a message to White House, executive department, and Congressional staff
that the vice president and his team were valued parts of the Administration.88
Light cautions that “none of the changes guarantees the vice president an active
advisory role; […] nothing in the institutional framework assumes presidential
willingness to listen.” He cites a Carter aide to illustrate this point: “After a while, it was
almost automatic for Carter to ask ‘What does Fritz Mondale think about this?’ It doesn’t
take too many questions like that before the staff goes to Fritz before the President
asks.”89
Carter and Mondale’s president-vice president relationship was a good one for
both men, as well as the institution of the vice presidency. Mondale’s “lauded loyalty to
the president” was rewarded with Carter’s consideration of his vice president as “his most
senior adviser.” The two also apparently became close personal friends, with Carter
calling Mondale “like a brother and a son,” and Mondale remarking that “Never before
has a vice president been so generously and so kindly treated by his president.” Finally,
87
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“Mondale considered the role he played in elevating the stature of the vice presidency his
greatest contribution during the Carter years.”90
Cronin and Genovese sum up the claims of many scholars: “Mondale is credited
with being perhaps the first in that job who regularly exercised substantive policy
influence.”91

g. The Mondale Model
All of Mondale’s structural changes endured beyond the Carter Administration.
His two immediate successors retained the institutional structures of the Mondale model,
but served under presidents less amenable than Carter to the advice of their second
officers.
In the first months, the relationship between President Ronald Reagan and his
vice president, George H.W. Bush, shared some of the tensions of the Kennedy-Johnson
relationship. As with Kennedy and Johnson, Reagan and Bush both sought their party’s
presidential nomination in a bitter and competitive primary process. As the Republican
National Convention approached its close, Reagan chose Bush as his running mate after
failing to agree to the terms with Gerald Ford on a co-presidency scheme. When those
plans fell apart, Reagan reached out to his more moderate primary opponent to unite the
party and take advantage of “the best résumé in politics.” Once in the White House,
Reagan hired a handful of top Bush advisers – most prominently, Bush campaign
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manager James Baker as White House Chief of Staff – and encouraged Bush to take a
West Wing office.92
Bush’s handling of the assassination attempt on Reagan as well as his extensive
efforts in support of Reagan’s economic program and other partisan objectives earned the
trust of the president and his team. As Bush and Reagan developed a partnership based
on “the positive personal relationship, the respect, trust, and loyalty; the regular daily and
weekly access,” Bush’s foreign policy expertise – he had been the American Ambassador
to the United Nations, the de facto ambassador to China, and the Director of Central
Intelligence – found its way into the Administration’s operations.93
According to Kengor, “most observers believe that George H.W. Bush enjoyed
almost as good a relationship with Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale enjoyed with
Jimmy Carter.” At the team’s second inaugural, Reagan praised Bush as “the best Vice
President this Republic has ever had.”94
Having been a vice president himself, Bush sought to assure his vice president
total integration and comfort in the new administration. But Dan Quayle entered the
White House in a position of weakness after sustaining a particularly damaging
campaign.
Quayle brought many dimensions of balance to President George H.W. Bush’s
ticket. As Kengor explains, Quayle was “conservative on cultural, economics, and
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defense issues;” “young and energetic;” “hugely popular” in his home state of Indiana; a
Baby Boomer; and the only Midwesterner on either national ticket.95
But Quayle quickly earned a reputation for incompetence and pomposity. His
debate with Senator Lloyd Bentsen offered one of the more famous moments of recent
debate history. When Quayle deflected a question about his experience by saying “I have
as much experience in the Congress as Jack Kennedy did when he sought the
presidency,” Bentsen retorted: “I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack
Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.”96 Quayle’s tough
campaign experience left him weak as he took office and throughout his term.97
Nevertheless, as Quayle explained, “President Bush, from the moment he took
office, made it clear to everyone in the West Wing that I was to have all the access that I
wanted.” Bush would also continue to offer Quayle a great deal of sympathy over the
course of their administration.98
Bush and Quayle enjoyed a friendly and comfortable relationship. They shared a
“regular Thursday lunch,” and Quayle oversaw a handful of domestic issues – his two top
efforts were the Space and Competitiveness Councils. Although Quayle was
occasionally “a clear political liability,” Bush was apparently happy with his vice
president’s performance. However, this comity did not translate into substantive policy
influence.99
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h. Albert Gore Jr.
The vice presidency Albert Gore Jr. envisioned drew directly from Mondale’s
vice presidential experience – he even consulted Mondale’s former chief of staff, Richard
Moe, in the days after the 1992 election.100 But by the time he set out on his own
campaign to succeed President William J. Clinton, Gore had replaced the Mondale model
with a version that included a new layer of influence.
Clinton took interest in Gore because of Gore’s relative independence and
moderate stances on foreign-policy issues. Both men were “New Democrats” and part of
the centrist Democratic Leadership Council – and they “always viewed one another
equally.” But Gore brought different sorts of balance to the ticket. Gore’s “solid family
background” countered the rumors of Clinton’s infideltities; Gore’s military service in
Vietnam countered criticisms of Clinton’s lack of service and opposition to the draft; and
Gore’s broad work in arms control and other foreign policy areas in the Senate countered
Clinton’s dearth of hands-on international experience101.
Gore described himself as filling a “general-advisor role” to Clinton, who
included his vice president in virtually all decisions of any consequence. But their
rapport included some dynamics atypical of most president-vice president relationships.
The younger Gore reportedly ended up giving Clinton advice on his strenuous lifestyle
and counseled the president on major managerial and staffing decisions. Gore’s
influence led to a series of staff changes over the course of their administration. In fact,
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The Economist once observed, that “to some [Gore] seems more presidential than the
president.”102
In addition to these roles, Gore introduced a new element of vice presidential
authority: an original personal policy agenda. As vice president, Gore led the
administration’s efforts on environmental policy, emerging technology, and a reinventing
government campaign. According to former Gore aide Paul Orzulak, Gore’s policy
portfolio was not a series of line assignments handed to him by the president; rather, they
were a series of issues about which Gore personally cared and on which he wished to
make progress – with Clinton’s blessing. In another unprecedented conferral of
authority, Gore also managed some international relationships; this included chairing
bilateral commissions with Russia, Egypt, and South Africa; leading nuclear nonproliferation policy; and negotiating the Kyoto Protocol.103
Yet, Gore’s influence diminished by the end of his tenure. Clinton’s indiscretions
in the Monica Lewinsky scandal caused Gore moral and political discomfort.104 As he
distanced himself from the president both publicly and privately, their personal
relationship suffered: according to Kengor, “by the summer of 2000, the two were hardly
speaking with one another.”105
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i. Richard B. Cheney
Richard B. Cheney took the vice presidential model he inherited from Gore and
exploded it to a scale previously unimaginable. Empowered by President George W.
Bush, Cheney wielded influence so broad and so deep – and so secret – as to be literally
immeasurable.
In 2000, Bush asked Cheney, one of his top outside advisers, to lead the project of
selecting a running mate. That process ended with Cheney as the nominee and on the
way to becoming what Cronin and Genovese call “the most consequential vice president
in American history.” Scholars and political observers agree that he “transformed” the
office into “a virtual shadow presidency and at times perhaps nearly a co-presidency.” 106
Because Cheney brought to the job extensive experience – eight years as a staffer
in the Nixon and Ford White Houses, including two as Chief of Staff; a tour as Ford’s
1976 campaign manager; 10 years in the House of Representatives, where he was elected
Republican Whip, four years as Bush I’s Secretary of Defense; and five years as
Chairman and CEO of Halliburton – Bush II allowed his vice president broad influence
and authority, including actual decision-making powers occasionally marked by dubious
legality.107
Cheney took command of the presidential transition and the ongoing recruitment
and placement of numerous “Cabinet, subcabinet, and Executive Office of the President
personnel.” After 9/11, Cheney took a role in shaping the administration’s foreign policy
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– especially “the overall conduct of U.S. anti-terrorism policies” and intelligence
management.108
According to journalist Barton Gellman, on September 11, 2001, Cheney gave the
order to shoot down unidentified aircraft without President Bush’s authorization.109
Much of the Cheney vice presidency remains unknown – and will likely remain
unknown for many years. Notoriously secretive, Cheney and his staff went to great
lengths to keep information out of the hands of the courts, the Congress, and the public.
One of their strategies was the introduction of an unofficial, extralegal classification
system. The vice president’s office had stamps made reading “Treat as classified,” or
“Treat as top secret” – designations that have no legal basis or meaning, but which will
confuse investigators and archivists for years to come.110
Cheney’s influential role appears unlikely to truly constitute a new model of the
vice presidency, because it cannot endure. His authority was so great as to induce
constitutional scholars to discuss a “crisis” created by “popular illegitimacy.”111 His
approval rating upon leaving office was 13% and he was often characterized as a more
evil version of Star Wars’s Darth Vader.112 No vice president will risk such unpopularity
by seeking a similar role.
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IV.

CONCLUSION: Joseph R. Biden Jr.
Less than 18 months into the Barack Obama Administration is too early to judge

the shape of Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s vice presidency. But the early months offer some
clues about where he is headed.
According to Biden allies, Biden entered the office with the belief “that Vice
President Cheney had an overly expansive view of the vice president” and “that the vice
president’s role is to be an adviser to the president and to be a member of the president’s
team, and that’s how he’s going to be in the job.”113 Biden has definitely rejected the
Cheney model he inherited – and he is the first vice president to ever shrink the footprint
of his office. But it remains unclear whether he has reverted to a previous model or is
forging a new one.
Some elements of his approach are becoming evident already.
Principally, he retains the structural prerogatives established by Mondale and
Gore – although, for instance, he is allowed one full time speechwriter to Gore’s phalanx
of four.114
According to news stories in Newsweek and the New York Times in the fall of
2009, Biden fulfills the general adviser role as an active participant in internal White
House policy and political decisions. He plays the role of devil’s advocate and takes
advantage of his situation as the only person in the room that the president cannot fire.115
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Despite earlier claims that he was “unlikely to have a specific docket of issues,”
the president has tasked Biden with some line assignments– though all are high-profile
endeavors.116 Biden oversees the implementation of the Recovery Act, chairs the Middle
Class Task Force, and manages the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Yet one
Biden aide acknowledges that such line assignments diminish his broader influence.
“Because they’re inherently time-consuming,” Biden has less availability and fewer
resources to engage with other issues and tasks.117
“As much as he said he didn’t want it, he’s very much in the Gore model” in
terms of taking on specific policy responsibilities, that aide claims. This should be
unsurprising given the fact that Biden’s chief of staff, Ron Klain, served in the same
capacity for Vice President Gore.118 Yet one uniquely Gore innovation remains absent
from Biden’s vice presidency: an original agenda.
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APPENDIX B
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LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE/INSIDER-OUTSIDER – WINNERS & LOSERS
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EXPERIENCE – WINNERS & LOSERS
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